P. Foot on killing and letting die

Foot on Killing and Letting Die (in James E. White text)

Consider this case: I have medicine & six people who can be helped by it. But one person needs 5 times more than any of the others. Morally, I should let him die in order to save the other 5.

From this, it does not follow that if I can kill one person, carve him up and use his organs to save five others, I am morally permitted to do so.

Same result, but a moral difference.

WHY IS THERE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KILLING AND LETTING DIE?

Rescue I

I must drive quickly to save 5 people. One person who is in trouble asks me to stop. If I stop and save him, I won't reach the other 5 and they will die. I drive past the one and save the five

Rescue I

I must drive quickly to save 5 people. The path is narrow and I can't leave it. A man is injured on the path. If I stop, I can save him, but I won't reach the other 5 in time and they will die. I drive over the guy in the path, killing him, and save the other 5.

Same result each time: 1 dead, 5 saved. But Rescue I is morally good and Rescue II is morally bad. WHY? WHAT EXPLAINS THIS?

Foot's proposal: Two things explain this. One is the nature of agency, and the second is the nature of rights.

Agency consists of two things:
1. A particular sequence of events explains why a particular thing happened (i.e., a consequence).
2. Some particular person(s) or agent(s) originated that sequence of events (i.e., it would not have happened otherwise).

Where 1 and 2 both hold, the originator of the sequence is the agent of the consequence.

In Rescue I, I am not the agent of the man's death. In Rescue II, I am the agent of his death (but I'm not the agent of the death of the other five).

James Rachels thinks that his Smith and Jones case shows that agency doesn't matter, that only the results matter. But Rachels is ignoring rights.

There are rights of noninterference and rights of service.
Rights to noninterference create a moral situation in which an agent must not interfere -- there is a negative duty, a duty not to be an agent.
Rights to service say that the agent must be an agent -- there is a positive duty to do something specific for a particular person.

Rights can be overridden, but it takes more to override a negative duty than a positive one.

The right to life is a right to noninterference. It is not a right to service. It is harder to override your right to life, but easy to deny you service if the same service is put to better use elsewhere.

Unless you already have a right to my service, your right to life does not require me to save you if I could instead save someone else.

In the case of Smith and Jones, they owe a service to the child in the bath. (Why? Because we owe care to children that we don't owe to adults.) Nothing in the story overrides this duty. And nothing in the story overrides the right to life. Smith fails with respect to the negative duty and Jones fails with respect to the positive. Each is bad for each fails in one duty.

Foot considers an objection: The Runaway Trolley!
Runaway trolley is headed for 5 people on the track. It will kill them. But you can throw a switch and send the trolley down another track. But one man is on that track. Does being the agent of the one man's death make it immoral to throw the switch?

Because my agency is that of diverting a sequence, not starting one.

Back to the main issue: Euthanasia

Nonvoluntary active euthanasia always violates a right to noninterference, and nothing overrides this, so it's always wrong.

Nonvoluntary passive euthanasia only violate a right to service, so it's only wrong where that right to service is not overriden.

Essay then continues by discussing abortion.