Harman's "Creation Ethics" 

Main point: the “very liberal” view of abortion is mistaken

  (the analysis is mistaken, not the attempt to be liberal about permitting abortion)

What position explains all of the following equally well? 

  • Some early fetuses merit a caring attitude, but some do not.

  • Some early fetuses should not be harmed.

  • It is understandable to be upset by an early miscarriage.

  • Uncertainty about the desirability (about whether to abort) is relatively unique.

  • It is reasonable to regret having had an abortion, yet there is no regret about the choice.

  • Abortion is a serious moral decision.

The very liberal view fails to give an adequate account of this combination of points (and so does the more conservative view).

HER ANSWER:

Quit trying to grant or deny moral status to all fetuses. Moral status is a contingent status. Some have it, some do not.

On what is it contingent?

Personhood.

Exactly HOW does personhood (and any resulting future like ours) relate to being a fetus?  

The Actual Future Principle: An early fetus has a moral status (e.g., should not be harmed) if and only if that fetus does later become a person.

In other words, the fetus does not necessarily have a future like ours (a future tied to personhood), because it does not necessarily have a future. So the mere fact that a fetus has developed up to some point does not establish that killing it it deprives it of something it should have.

Harman's KEY ASSUMPTION: "What could or would have happened is morally irrelevant: all that is relevant is what will happen." ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES ARE WHAT MATTER!

COMPARE with Marquis: An early fetus has a moral status because it can have a future like ours, due to later personhood.

 

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Last updated Nov 18, 2005