Judith Jarvis Thomson on the Morality of Abortion 

 Main Issue: If we grant that a fetus has a right to life, does that make voluntary abortion immoral?

Thomson's strategy is to get us to think about cases that do not involve abortion, in order to force us to articulate our basic moral assumptions. Some of these cases are pretty silly, but that is because she wants us to think about the moral issues without obscuring the issues with the emotional dimensions of the abortion issue. Only after we make a moral decision about a non-abortion case does she examine the implications for abortion.

Analogy 1 (Pregnancy due to rape)

Kidnapped, you wake up and find that you are connected to a famous violinist, who needs your kidneys for the next 9 months.

Although the violinist is an innocent person with a right to life, separating yourself would kill the violinist. Yet it would be moral to "unplug" yourself, even if it means the death of the violinist. If you didn't consent to supporting the violinist for 9 months, you don't have an obligation to do so. 

Moral conclusion: the violinist's right to life does not give the violinist a right to your body.

Similarly, pregnancy due to rape is an unjust relationship, and a woman does not have an obligation to carry the fetus to term, and the fetus' right to life is not enough to require continuation of the pregnancy.

Analogy 2 (carrying fetus to term will kill the mother)

Same as #1, but the strain on your kidneys will kill you within a month.

Your own right to life gives you the moral right to unplug yourself if your life is threatened.

Similarly, if both the woman and the fetus have a right to life, then the woman's right to life gives her the right to end a pregnancy that threatens her own life.

Analogy 3 (Ectopic pregnancy)

You are trapped in a tiny, tiny house with a rapidly expanding child, whose growth will crush you. The child is “innocent” with respect to the threat on your life. Yet, should you choose to defend your right to life, it is morally permissible to kill this child to save your own life.

Moral conclusion: directly killing an innocent person is sometimes moral.

Similarly, directly killing a fetus can sometimes be justified. The extreme view, which would forbid all abortion, is mistaken.

Analogy 4 (the issue of third party impartiality)

Jones has put on a coat, but will freeze to death if it is taken away. However, Smith will freeze to death if the coat is not given to Smith. Jones stole the coat from Smith.

Obviously, if it's Smith's coat, others have a right to intervene to get it back to Smith. The fact that Jones will now freeze to death is not a reason to deny aid to Smith.

Similarly, when a woman can morally have an abortion, others are moral in providing abortion services. It is wrong to criminalize all "third party" support for abortion.

Analogy 5a and 5b (What does a right to life entail? Thomson suggests that this is the most important question in the abortion debate.)

Sick and about to die, the cool touch of Fonda’s hand will heal you. (a) Fonda is not in this part of the country. (b) Fonda is out in the hall.

In case 5a, Fonda does nothing wrong in refusing to travel here to heal you. But in case 5b, Fonda would be horribly unjust not to heal you. What does this difference demonstrate about the right to life?

Three versions of a right to life:

Generous: Your right to life gives you a right to “the bare minimum” you need to continuing living.

Less generous: Your right to life gives you a right not to be killed by anyone.

Least generous: Your right to life gives you a right not to be killed unjustly.

The mere physical distance between you and Fonda cannot generate a right to have Fonda help you. So we should interpret the right to life in the strictest way, and we should look for some other reason (other than a right to life) to explain why Fonda would be unjust to refuse to help you in case 5b.

Analogy 6a and 6b  (That one ought to do something doesn’t establish a right to it)

A box is full of chocolates, and one brother refuses to give any to another brother. (a) They were jointly given the box as a gift. (b) Only the brother who has the box was given them.

If one brother refuses to share in case 6a, the action is unjust because the other brother has a right to half.

But in case 6b, even if the refusal to share is indecent, and shows that the brother is a self-centered and horrible person, it is not unjust, because no right has been violated. The brother ought to share because sharing when we can is morally good, not because others have a right to what we have.

Moral conclusion: People ought to be Minimally Decent Samaritans, but the rights of one person don't generate a requirement of a higher standard of obligatory personal sacrifice. 

If you are attached to the violist because you were kidnapped, but you only need to remain there for one hour, Minimally Decent Samaritanism requires you to remain for the hour.

Similarly, in abortion cases, if a woman has no rights that she can point to in order to justify the abortion (no threat to her life and health, for instance), and the pregnancy has already progressed, then Minimally Decent Samaritanism requires continuing the pregnancy.

Analogy 7a, 7b, 7c (The limits of personal responsibility)

You open a window because it is a hot night. (a) A burglar climbs in the window. Everyone says, “It’s your fault.” (b) The burglar broke in despite the bars you installed on your windows. (c) People-seeds drift in, despite the expensive mesh screens you have installed to prevent their entry.

Proposed principle: An unborn person has a right to the mother's body (beyond the general right to life) ONLY IF the pregnancy resulted from her voluntary act. A voluntary act is an informed act. The woman must have consented to the act that resulted in pregnancy, and must have done so in full knowledge of the chance of pregnancy.

Are you responsible for being robbed in 7A? Doesn't 7b protect you from the charge that you "consented" to the robbery? And doesn't 7c also protect you from responsibility for the life of the person-plant?

Similarly, with pregnancy, there are reasonable standards for deciding which actions taken to avoid pregnancy (short of sterilization) should be counted as establishing lack of consent to a resulting pregnancy.