What’s in the Name ‘Applied Anthropology’? 
An Encounter with Global Practice

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“We need to anthropologize the West: show how exotic its constitution of reality has been; emphasize those domains most taken for granted as universal (this includes epistemology...); make them seem historically peculiar as possible; show how their claims to truth are linked to social practices and have hence become effective forces in the social world” (Rabinow 1986:241).

Historical accounts of applied anthropology’s development are represented well in the disciplinary literature from both European and North American sources (see Foster 1969, Bastide 1973, Partridge and Eddy 1978, Gardner and Lewis 1996, Bennett 1996, and van Willigen 2002. These reviews sometimes begin with an exposition of the colonial roots of applied anthropology, and often end up describing its florescence in America the final quarter of the 20th century. North American histories suggest that developments in the United States reflect a mature and ideal form of applied anthropology. Apparently, only in the U.S. exist (1) formal academic training programs for distinctively identified applied anthropologists, (2) national and local professional organizations devoted to the application and practice of anthropology, and (3) full-time professional anthropologists working in various roles across occupational fields outside the academy. No other nation has developed such an established institutional infrastructure for applied and practicing anthropology. Reasons for this are not immediately clear.

The elaborate infrastructure in the U.S. does not preclude that anthropologists in other nations do not apply or practice anthropology. As this volume and the previous work (Baba and Hill 1997) demonstrate, anthropologists in many countries may predominantly practice or practice in addition to other occupational roles. Nevertheless, they have not developed special institutional mechanisms that parallel those found in the U.S. and generally have not named their application or practice as such. It is simply called anthropology, not applied anthropology or practicing anthropology. Our claim is that naming is an integral component of the constitution of reality (and, in this case, the “anthropologizing” of that reality), as a name may reflect a distinctive and separate cognitive construct, with unique cultural meaning (Strauss and Quinn 1997). By focusing on the domain of applied anthropology, often taken for granted in the United States, we may contribute to making it “seem as historically peculiar as possible” (Rabinow 1986:241) and reveal the institutional structures and practices conducive to its flourishing in the U.S. As Chambers noted, the histories of applied anthropology have been written without much more than a “nod” to the social and political contexts, “a significant weakness in a field which is clearly molded to such contexts” (Chambers 1987:310). In addition, an effort to “anthropologize” this domain may enable us to detect factors impeding the naming of applied and practicing anthropology in other nations and regions.
In this reflective essay, we explore the contextual influences upon the naming and non-naming of applied anthropology. Our method is historical and comparative and is designed to gain access to perspectives that originate and develop in areas outside the U.S. We, as the authors draw upon our American experiences and literature; however, an important body of evidence is supplied by various and, generally, non-American authors in this and the previous collection (Baba and Hill 1997). Because of this expansion in perspective, some conclusions reached are different from those traditionally received. We view these two collections on the global practice of anthropology as cultural assemblages that allow us to explore the contexts of knowledge and practice in anthropology situated across the First, (formerly) Second, and Third Worlds. By comparing these diverse contexts chronologically, we hope to gain a better understanding of why applied and practicing anthropology have evolved distinctively in different places.

Our exploration shows that all anthropology, and not only applied and practicing anthropology is inextricably bound to its historical and cultural contexts, meaning that there are important differences in the way the discipline is understood and practiced.

Moreover, historical shifts in context have perpetuated important changes in the discipline’s practice over time (and we mean here practice within the entire anthropological community not only in the work of applied anthropologists). The implications of contextual relevance are significant and salient for all anthropologists. Unless American anthropologists wish to suggest that we possess the ‘one true way’ to practice anthropology, we need to give serious consideration to alternative ways of knowing and practicing, some of which are already being adopted by our counterparts elsewhere in the world.

We also argue that if globalization is transforming the nature of connectedness and boundaries across nations, then there are likely consequences for the distinctive forms of applied and practicing anthropology discovered in this volume, as well as our known forms in the U.S. Our investigation leads us to postulate that some of the differences we have observed between applied and practicing anthropology in the United States and elsewhere are beginning to blur and that the unique regime of applied and practicing anthropology developed in the U.S. over the last quarter of the 20th century is destined to be transformed and more integrated into the mainstream of the discipline and, indeed, into all of global anthropology.

A RE-FORMED VIEW OF APPLIED AND PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY

The Naming of Applied Anthropology in Its Colonial Context: 1880-1945

The initial naming of applied anthropology may be traced to the colonial regime of Great Britain, where anthropologists first sought to convince administrators to fund their field work in the absence of other means of support. According to Adam Kuper:
From its very early days, British anthropology liked to present itself as a science which could be useful in colonial administration. The reasons are obvious. The colonial governments and interests were the best prospects of financial support, particularly in the decades before the discipline was granted recognition by the universities (1983:100).

Before World War II, the British colonial government provided virtually no funding for social science research in Africa, the main theatre of anthropological operations (Mills 2002). There was funding for training of colonial administrators in anthropological and ethnographic skills, thereby founding, at Oxford, the first anthropology departments (van Willigen 2002). Subsequently, some colonial governments created positions for a government anthropologist (e.g., southern Nigeria), and even sponsored applied studies that anthropologists could perform. Otherwise, anthropologists had to be creative in their search for funds. According to Kuper (1983), leading anthropologists such as Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown became known in the 1920s and 1930s for touting the practical virtues of anthropology and ethnography as a means to address colonial problems, but this was primarily a sales pitch for securing ad hoc research funding. Kuper (1983) argues that, once the money was in hand, anthropologists were likely to do what amounted to a bait and switch, conducting a basic research investigation, while assuming that the colonial sponsor could extract the necessary information from it without the anthropologists’ help. Kuper (1983) asserts that many British anthropologists at the time were functionalists or liberals, and therefore were theoretically or ideologically disinclined to aid and abet the administrators’ interests in understanding social change (which many anthropologists viewed as dangerous; i.e., change could be damaging to the people anthropologists studied, and to anthropology itself, as it might wipe out the discipline’s subject matter). Needless to say, these proclivities did not endear the anthropologist to the administrator (the latter often stereotyping the former as a “romantic reactionary;” Kuper 1983:114). Another anthropological practice of the time was to assign one’s protégé or a junior scholar to do an applied study, as such work was thought to be better suited to less well prepared individuals. Kuper states that:

When, more or less reluctantly, the anthropologist ‘did some applied work’, he tended to pick one of a limited range of topics. (I say he, but applied work was often regarded by the more mandarin as less demanding intellectually, and therefore as best suited to women. Malinowski’s first student to be dispatched to do a study of ‘culture change’ in Africa was chosen because it was thought she was still too new to anthropology to do a conventional tribal study)…(anthropologists participated) only grudgingly (as a rule) in the little studies dreamt up by the administrators, and accepting the view that they should not speak out on matters of policy, not being ‘practical men’(1983:110-12).

Kuper goes on to argue that “the reality is that British anthropologists were little used by the colonial authorities, and despite their rhetoric when in pursuit of funds, they were not particularly eager to be used” (1983:116). Other scholars have noted, however, that there was complicity and symbiosis between anthropologists and colonial
administrators during the era of British empire, as the anthropologists used the promise of applied solutions to extract funds for research, and this is how the initial theoretical foundation of social anthropology was formulated (Mills 2002; see also chapter on Great Britain in this volume).

Our interpretation of the foregoing is that early colonial practices generated the structures for what became a two-tier model of knowledge production in anthropology, and that this model provided the grounds upon which theory and practice were later separated. The first tier was reserved for free-wheeling ‘pure’ theory, with the ‘other’ or second tier intended for more short-term, derivative ‘applied’ studies. In accordance with the paternalistic tendencies of colonialism, the theorists were given ‘right of first refusal’ to the second tier. By implication, those who were assigned to work on the second tier could not choose to work on the first tier. Initially, this incipient two-tier structure was not quite so cut and dried, because there were few academic positions available and anthropologists had to be flexible regarding postings.

The context shifted in the 1930s and 1940s with significant changes in British colonial policy and the beginning of World War II. As a response to critics who charged that the colonies were isolated and not ‘developing’ economically, the British decided to engage in more affirmative administrative planning that could provide a stimulus to the economic growth of the colonies (Mills 2002). Funding began to flow toward social science research in Africa during the 1930s through a number of mechanisms, including grants from the Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation. Some of these funds allowed anthropologists to free themselves from a triangular relationship involving colonial patrons and subjects, and to move toward a dyadic relationship with subjects that represented the academic model (Pels and Salemink 1999). In the 1940s, the British enacted the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA), a legislative reform agenda for the colonies that finally provided substantial government funding for social science research in the colonies, including funds for anthropology. The principal contextual shift prompting this official change in policy was the start of World War II in 1939, and Britain’s need to respond to those who criticized its empire (especially the Americans).

Mills (2002) provides a detailed account of the Colonial Social Science Research Council (CSSRC), which was established to set and implement policy for the allocation of research funds that would fulfill the CDWA mandate. Initially, it was anthropologists at the London School of Economics (LSE) who became most closely affiliated with the CSSRC (Raymond Firth and Audrey Richards). Both were protégés of Malinowski, one of applied anthropology’s great advocates. They embraced the reformist goals of the CDWA integrating scientific and pragmatic research objectives. Mills (2002:171) notes:

There is a little doubt that the members of the CSSRC saw themselves as intellectual pioneers, leading the way both in mapping out uncharted territories of African social research problems, and in trail-blazing the new possibilities for a problem-oriented multi-disciplinary social science.
The CSSRC recognized the importance of advancing the knowledge base and viewed both fundamental and pragmatic research as pursuant to this goal since little was known about human society in Africa. While colonial social problems provided a context within which research was framed, anthropology was able to transform such research into a satisfying theoretical product. This enabled the discipline to gain legitimacy within the academy (Mills 2002). Without this transformation, the entire project would have collapsed; anthropology had to emerge as a ‘science’, or it would not receive government funding. This success increased the number of academic departments and positions in anthropology steadily during this period. By 1953, there were 38 teaching positions in anthropology, compared with only a handful prior to 1940 (Mills 2002). An entirely new professional association was spun-off in 1946 to represent strictly academic anthropologists (i.e., the Association for Social Anthropology or ASA).

Significantly, however, tensions mounted between anthropologists based at the LSE and those at Oxford (see Pink in this volume). The latter believed that matters of academic policy should be under the control of academic departments, not the colonial office or the research institutes funded by the CSSRC. The opposing sets of interests were institutional (Oxford versus LSE), political (anti-colonial versus reformist), and philosophical (theory versus practice). It must be emphasized, however, that although the Oxford scholars did not hold practical anthropology in high regard, they still wanted to receive the CSSCR funding and control it themselves. While the academic factions battled over resources as well as against each other’s institutional agendas, the British empire continued to erode. Its eventual demise was signaled by the outbreak of violence in Africa during the late 1940s and early 1950s. After the CSSRC wound up its affairs in 1961, it became clear that the British anthropologists were dependent on it for student training funds, as these went dry and there were no ready substitutes until later in the decade.

Mills (2002) argues that the relationship between theory and practice within the colonial context of Great Britain was a paradoxical one. The context for anthropology was decidedly pragmatic, at the very least because the government needed the cover provided by intellectuals who appeared to be doing careful studies leading to colonial ‘development and welfare.’ At the same time, academic anthropology was struggling to emerge as an autonomous profession from others that proffered ethnographic skill, such as colonial administrators, missionaries, and travelers (see Pels and Salemink 1999). The financial support and autonomy provided by the CSSRC enabled the discipline to legitimize itself. Yet British academia gained the upper hand in the production of anthropological knowledge, breaking the triangle of anthropology-subject-sponsor, and leaving only the dyad of anthropologist and subject, sans sponsor. As the British stopped operating their colonies, applied anthropology was politically disgraced, and academic anthropology ended its use of the applied name. Theory thus became separated from practice, and the discipline became increasingly marginalized and lost its pragmatic value.

We suggest that the interaction of an imperialist economy and the British class system encouraged the split between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ anthropology during the British colonial era. The imperialist system, particularly Indirect Rule as practiced by the
British, called for representatives of the colonial administration to observe the colony at arms length (i.e., gather empirical data, but still be able to leave—a good fit with participant observation), the hierarchical and paternalistic social system that flourished under colonialism virtually guaranteed that activity that was conceptualized by administrators in a top-down fashion, or detailed or technical work (in the field), would not be tolerated by the top men in the discipline. Thus, high-status theorists would conduct “pure science”, and lower status junior scholars or applied researchers would do task-oriented projects.

As Foster (1969) points out, anthropology as a discipline was not well developed enough theoretically or methodologically in its early days (or even now, for that matter) to permit such hermetic separation of theorists and applied researchers into neat boxes, and sometimes it was not different people doing the work on the ground (i.e., theorists did applied studies). The point is, however, that ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ anthropology were reproducing an imperialist social class system. It was important to the continuity of the British society and empire that criteria be established and reinforced regarding superior and inferior roles in the anthropological status hierarchy, and it was also important that the identities associated with these roles be impressed upon individuals who might be filling them in the future. The theorist role was to be filled by someone capable to produce theory (read: educated ‘properly’). This person could do the applied anthropology if he so chose. The reverse was not to be the case, however. Consequently, we have the initial roots of a knowledge-based production role that was intentionally not capable (or not allowed?) to produce theory. We suggest that this structural model of theoretical-applied anthropology is the one in which applied anthropology was explicitly named, and it is this model that ultimately became the historical legacy for applied anthropology in the United States, though not immediately. As we will show, there was an important detour first.

What Happened to ‘Applied Anthropology’ in the Second World Case?

An interesting comparison can be made between colonialist Europe and the nations of the former Soviet bloc, especially Russia. Anthropology was an established discipline in that country during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Later, in communist Russia, anthropologists were encouraged to focus on understanding and administering the peoples of the internal colonies (i.e., indigenous people and ethnic groups), but with a subtle difference from colonialist Europe. The evolution of socio-cultural forms had been incorporated into Soviet ideology via Marx and Engels’ writing (e.g., *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* [see Harris 1968]). Thus, anthropology came to be entwined with scientific socialism, and as a result its theories and methods were heavily politicized. For example, ethnology was considered by some communists to be more progressive than ethnography (which was deemed too bourgeois; i.e., knowledge of one society for its own sake, not for revolutionary purposes). This distinction led to the bizarre situation described by Yamskov (in this volume) in which certain approaches to anthropology were severely criticized (e.g., cooperating with geography), even though those advancing the criticism were later imprisoned and put to
death and their textbooks banned. Russian anthropology (or ethnography) was rehabilitated in the 1930s, but only as segment of the history discipline. It was compelled to avoid any methodological links with geography, following a dogmatic pronouncement by Stalin denying any environmental influence on the development of society (Matley 1966).

Almost from the beginning of the Soviet era, the notion of ‘applying’ research results gained from academic studies was heavily promoted in the research academies. According to Yamskov (personal communication 2005), Communist Party and state officials made direct and continual requests that anthropologists extract the ‘applied aspects’ of their academic scholarship, and use this knowledge to benefit local populations and administrations. Research institute leaders also stressed the practical outcomes of ethnographic studies as a means to justify the discipline’s existence. Scholars were required to submit annual reports explaining how their work contributed to socialist objectives. In Russia, the focus of much ‘applied’ work was on indigenous people and ethnic groups; for example, alphabets and written languages were developed for Northern indigenous peoples. At times, the scholars were trying to introduce changes on their own initiative (e.g., teaching languages) that they believed would benefit local peoples, but at other times they were trying to stop or at least slow down other changes introduced by the state (e.g., collectivization in the North). Scholars also pressed their institutes’ administrators to pass their recommendations on to state or party officials (Yamskov, personal communication 2005). While ethnic majority anthropologists (that is, not ethnic natives or minorities) might serve as consultants to the Soviet government, they had little real power. Later on, if ethnologists joined the government, they were to stop their research, with only a couple of exceptions (see Yamskov, in this volume).

In the Russian case, a notable segment of anthropology was (and is) ‘applied’ in the sense that anthropologists have been focused on practical uses and problems as defined by the state. However, there were (and are) very few instances of ‘applied anthropology’ in an institutional or formally named sense. Reasons for this can be examined from the standpoint of our hypothesis regarding the historical and cultural contexts of knowledge production. We suggest that (unspoken) political and ideological disagreements both within anthropology and between the anthropological community and the state, prevented a consensus regarding the nature of anthropological practice, which mitigated against the adoption of a common linguistic representation for applied activity. As noted above, some Russian scholars were introducing changes to indigenous or other local populations on their own initiative, while others were acting to block or halt interventions sponsored by the state. Given the political conditions within the Soviet state prior to the 1980s, it was not possible to discuss openly the reasons for blocking state interventions; we assume that some of these actions were more or less covert. This was a tricky and risky business, not knowing whom one could trust. It was from these murky political and ideological waters that an explicitly named ‘applied anthropology’ failed to emerge. This name usually has meant delivery of practical value to some sponsor or community beyond anthropology. But in the context of Soviet-era politics and ideology, the anthropologists did not appear to have agreed with the state or party sponsors (or even amongst themselves) regarding the value of the pragmatic work that they were doing. Perhaps, they did not talk about the ‘value’ they were delivering, or
they were halting the deliver of someone else’s ‘value’ (i.e., as ‘value’ was defined by the state). Only after the fall of the Soviet Union could scholars openly disagree and oppose state-sponsored programs (see Yamskov, in this volume).

The Russian case suggests that in the triangle of anthropologist-subject-sponsor which creates the context of applied anthropology, the anthropologist must have the professional autonomy to choose the relationships she forms with subjects and sponsors, and be free to criticize or break these relationships if they are considered inappropriate or unethical. In the absence of such professional autonomy, the activity that is practiced should not be named ‘applied anthropology’. Generally, we believe this case shows that if there is no ‘community of practice’ freely sharing its knowledge, methods, and values (Lave and Wenger 1991), there can be no special name for practice. In the Russian case, our colleagues may not have had the autonomy necessary to criticize openly the state for the programs of intervention propagated among indigenous people, but they resisted through their own means, at risk to themselves. Moreover, they did not name this activity ‘applied anthropology,’ and for that we may be grateful.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the political and ideological reasoning against the naming of applied anthropology weakens, and we might expect formally named ‘applied’ structures to emerge. In fact, there have been some efforts along these lines, as described by Yamskov (in this volume). However, resource scarcity, particularly among academic and research institutions in Russia after 1990, has prevented full scale specialization. Many academic anthropologists and ethnologists have needed involvement in extra project work to supplement their incomes attained from academic institutions, due to resource reductions. Since project work usually has an ‘applied’ character, there has been a further blurring of demarcations between more academic and ‘applied’ anthropology in Russia after 1990. However, there is still no naming of ‘applied anthropology’ in that country.8

What Happened to ‘Applied Anthropology’ in the Third World Case?

We must also examine the case presented by the so-called Third World nations prior to World War II. During this period, ‘native anthropologists9’ began to be trained and practice in their nations and regions. These anthropologists differed from those based in Europe, in that they focused on peoples and cultures within their countries of origin, and their work had policy impacts upon their own peoples. The major project of many ‘native anthropologists’ of the Third World during this period was the development and strengthening of the modern nation-state. Applied anthropologists typically followed a modernization theory of practice (e.g., acculturation theory) that supported policy aimed at strengthening the nation as a polity of citizens (Robeiro 2004)10. Indigenous peoples or other ethnic groups often were marginalized and impoverished, and did not participate as citizens (or, perhaps more accurately, were not allowed to participate). ‘Native anthropologists’ of the Third World sought to change this situation; they worked to make the marginalized peoples full citizens.
Despite the significant engagement of Third World ‘native anthropologists’ in policy, as well as in practice-oriented research and intervention in their countries of origin, there was little or no institutionalization of ‘applied anthropology’ structures per se in the Third World prior to World War II (or more recently for that matter). The role of ‘pure’ theoretical anthropology in these nations was more or less reserved for anthropologists of the colonizer nations, who visited the colonies to make observations that enabled them to ‘do anthropology’ in the cause of science or theory. The ‘native anthropologists’ of the colonies were trained by these colonizers to do ‘applied’ work, and the ‘natives’ embraced the notion of applying anthropology to address problems and to help build their nations. Virtually all ‘native anthropologists’ did applied anthropology in one form or another, even if they also held academic posts. However there was no need for a special institutional designation for ‘applied anthropology’, since there were not two classes of knowledge work internal to their societies. The pure theorists were visitors, part of the imperialist wing of the world economy based elsewhere. Also, it may be postulated that resource scarcity in the Third World precluded institutional structures that would support a class of knowledge work devoted strictly to ‘pure’ knowledge production. Only the colonizers could afford such luxury. If Third World anthropologists wanted to theorize, they would inevitably have to work on it in addition to their applying and practicing.

The Second Naming of Applied Anthropology in the United States

We have discussed above the cases of the U.K., Russia (Second World), and the Third World. Now let us return to the issue of the naming of applied anthropology in the United States. During the early part of the colonial era, and especially World War II, there was not a clear split between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ anthropology in the U.S. (Chambers 1987; Bennett 1996). Few academic posts were available, theoretical anthropology was not well developed, and most American anthropologists (with a few exceptions) did not have access to resources that would enable them to travel to foreign field sites. Their best opportunities for field research were struggling Native American communities. Anthropologists were employed via the U.S. Government in ‘applied’ roles related to the administration of the internal colonies. One of the early uses of the name ‘applied anthropology’ in the U.S. was by the Office of Indian Affairs, which established an Applied Anthropology Unit in the 1930s to halt resource depletion on Native American (designated) lands and encourage Native participation in the management of resources (Gardner and Lewis 1996). At the time, American anthropology was hailed as a practical discipline that could contribute to Native American policies, although efforts were largely descriptive and had little effect on policy-making. Anthropologists in this era had scant experience working in applied arenas, and were often more interested in abstract problems and traditional depictions of Native American cultures before the arrival of Europeans, not as they existed in contemporary reality (Partridge and Eddy 1978). A result was that anthropology sometimes was characterized as favoring the preservation of traditional cultures, thereby drawing opposition from government administrators.
Yet, anthropology’s involvement with Native American policies in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the larger interdisciplinary orientation within the social sciences (see Bennett 1996, Kuper 1999), appears to have had an influence on the discipline as a whole. The willingness to engage—and engage is the key word here—in the problems of contemporary American society was reflected in the establishment of the Society for Applied Anthropology (SfAA) at Harvard in May, 1941 (prior to America’s entry into World War II)\(^3\). The Society was founded by a group of distinguished anthropologists and others (e.g., psychologists, sociologists), including Conrad Arensburg, Gregory Bateson, Ruth Benedict, Elliot Chapple, Margaret Mead, George Murdoch, William Foote Whyte, among several others. While the British colonial anthropologists talked about practice (while they delivered primarily theory), these American anthropologists ‘walked the talk.’ They genuinely were interested in the application of anthropological (and other sources of) knowledge to social problems, and they did the work. Their goal was to integrate scientific and pragmatic objectives, as was clear in the mission statement
to promote scientific investigation of the principles controlling the relations of human beings to one another and to encourage the wide application of these principles to practical problems (Arensberg 1947:1).

This statement appeared in their journal *Applied Anthropology* (later named *Human Organization*). They viewed theoreticians as interested primarily in the search for abstract laws or principles, while they were more intrigued by concrete applications of knowledge in the modern world and what could be learned from such exercises. They recognized the intellectual synergy between theory and practice, and they wanted their own journal devoted to “attempts to appraise and use the agreed-upon core of knowledge or tested method,” without being overridden by ‘abstract’ science (Arensberg 1947:1). The early issues of the journal demonstrate the commitment of these anthropologists to this goal.

There are significant parallels between the American anthropologists of the World War II era and their British counterparts at the London School of Economics. Both envisioned their brand of anthropology as a new kind of interdisciplinary practice that could join science with application on equal terms to solve important contemporary problems. Many disciplines and professions were invited to join; this was not an exercise in ‘pure’ anthropology. Attention was warranted by the most distinguished practitioners of the time, names that we continue to recognize today. However, in both locations, majorities in the anthropological core did not embrace the notion of ‘application’, but still were more interested in abstract, theoretical pursuits. Ultimately, these mainstream colleagues became more dominant, even as the discipline was marginalized.

Several contextual factors in the U.S. encouraged the formation of a distinctive American model. The United States prior to World War II, unlike Great Britain, was not a hegemonic global economic power, but was relatively isolationist (Partridge and Eddy 1978). The Great Depression and World War II presented immediate and compelling problems, and shifted the attention of intellectuals toward contemporary troubles. In this atmosphere, we postulate that anthropologists developed a sense of responsibility toward addressing issues of their own society, as evidenced by the contents of the journal
Applied Anthropology (e.g., industrial relations, mental health, social work and social welfare), in spite of continuing bias toward static analyses (i.e., not studying the effects of social change over time). The linkage of contemporary problems and theoretical interests (i.e., theory is needed to solve difficult problems) might of enhanced the prestige of application and reduced the social distance between ‘pure’ and applied anthropology. In other words, if solving contemporary problems is important to society, and theory remains integral to anthropology, then the linkage of these two elements could heighten the importance of applied anthropology within the discipline. The American case contrasts with that of the U.K., where anthropology by and large was divorced from contemporary problems of British society proper and became isolated by focusing on colonial subjects.

Other features of the American landscape encouraged anthropologists in the U.S. to experiment with both theoretical and applied pursuits simultaneously, thereby blurring distinctions between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ roles. For example, the social class structure of the United States was not as formal and elaborate as that of Great Britain (Cavanagh 1990). An egalitarian ethos and interclass mobility were more characteristic of American society than was the case in Europe (Kerckhoff et al. 1985; Bennett 1996). In the U.S., these features might have encourage more collaboration between various forms of knowledge work within the discipline. Moreover, pragmatism, America’s only home-grown philosophy, likely influenced the definition and production of knowledge (i.e. truth is that which contributes to the most human good over the longest course). American entrepreneurs, for example, famously do not worry about organizational charts but rather assemble an organic team with everyone capable of doing multiple tasks interchangeably. Something similar might have been happening at Harvard in 1941. The founders of SfAA were, arguably, ‘entrepreneurial anthropologists’ who sensed an opening in the economic and political order prior to World War II. Indeed, the start of the war initiated the remarkable process by which American applied anthropology came to the forefront over the British, as is discussed in the next section.

The Redefinition of Applied Anthropology in America: 1945–1990

Between 1930 and 1960, independence movements grew in the former colonies and anthropology began to be criticized as a ‘handmaiden of colonialism’. It was during this time that anthropologists of the European colonizer nations developed a tendency to reject anthropological application and practice altogether, rather than distinguishing between its use in the service of colonialism and its use toward other potential goals (e.g., see chapter on Portugal). This tendency was fostered by the hierarchical status relationship between ‘pure’ and applied anthropology originating from Great Britain. Why engage in a kind of anthropology associated with a discredited and fading empire, in addition to its relegated second-class status?

It is no coincidence that the Europeans’ farewell to applied anthropology occurred just as the U.S. ended its international isolation through its entry into World War II. The war represented a major realignment of economic and political relations the world over.
There was the end of colonialism, and the start of the Cold War, the effort of capitalism to find new markets, and the beginning of the ear of ‘development’ policy as applied to the so-called Third World. These changes were reflected in disciplinary developments around the globe. It was after World War II that the United States emerged as an economic, political, and military superpower, and American anthropologists took the lead in institutionalizing applied anthropology. With this shift, a split between ‘pure’ and applied anthropology emerged in the U.S., this time taking a distinctly American form; Fiske and Chambers (1997:283) have called it “a dance of distance and embrace” (more distance than embrace, in our view).

We suggest that three primary factors contributed to a theoretical-applied split in North America, none of which were prominent prior to World War II. They are (1) an explosion in the demand for ‘pure’ (academic) anthropology and the subsequent rise of theoretical anthropology in the United States; (2) the emergence of epistemological, ethical, and political issues related to the application of anthropology, whose effect cast a shadow of doubt over the intellectual and moral legitimacy of application; and (3) job market growth for non-academic practitioners in the U.S. with the rise of new institutional structures to support applied anthropology, which led to a subtle shift in the definition of applied anthropology (in America). The interaction of these three factors restructured applied anthropology in the U.S. to the extent that the vision of the SfAA founders could not be realized. That is, anthropological theory and practice were not to become partners trying to solve contemporary problems (Bennett 1996). We examine each of the three factors and their consequences below.

1. The rise of academic anthropology in the United States. During the 1950s and 1960s, university campuses in the U.S. expanded dramatically in size and scope, and anthropologists began to find significantly more academic posts (Partridge and Eddy 1978). We consulted the records of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) on new degrees granted in anthropology during the 30 years between 1948 and 1978 (Baba 1994). In 1947 the discipline was very small with 408 members of the AAA (Kuper 1999), and in 1948 only 24 anthropology Ph.D.’s were awarded. By contrast, in 1978, 414 Ph.D.’s were produced. This academic engine also increased its capacity to generate baccalaureate degrees in anthropology for 139 to 6,324 annually over the same period. In the early 1970s, the majority of the new Ph.D.’s were placed within the academy to produce the next generation of anthropologists. Data from the AAA Survey of Ph.D.’s shows that in 1971-72, 92 percent of new Ph.D.’s in anthropology found employment in academe, with 56 percent employed in anthropology departments and another 19 percent employed in join departments (i.e., 75 percent of the total).

With this explosion in size and foreign fieldwork finding new sources of financial support (e.g., the National Science Foundation), theoretical developments in the discipline leaped forward as never before, with many intellectual advances in the 1960s and 1970s (see Ortner 1984). These advances, however, did not emerge from, or address, contemporary social problems. They were generated primarily by academic anthropologists in pursuit of ‘pure’ knowledge (albeit through intensive fieldwork), often framed at high levels of abstraction only applied to contemporary social problems with difficulty17. The American economic hegemony following World War II was
accompanied by a theoretical ascendancy in American anthropology, similar to that witnessed in Great Britain during its days of empire. Imperial Britain, and then the post-World War II United States, possessed the economic resources to generate a dominant theoretical discipline.

2. Epistemology, politics and ethics. The ascendancy of academic anthropology and knowledge advancement for its own sake were accompanied by an academic culture that increasingly guarded its own interests. Cultural forms arose that denoted the proper conduct of an anthropologist, and oftentimes these seemed to discriminate between ‘pure’ and applied anthropology. Whether in graduate student training, debates internal to the AAA, articles in the literature, or institutional policies, the effect of the emerging discourse during the 1960s and 1970s was to establish ‘pure’ (i.e., non-applied academic) anthropology as the preferred category and to relegate applied or practicing anthropology to an ‘other’ category that implied to be more dangerous, questionable, or even ‘unethical’. The moves by which applied anthropology was placed in a secondary position involved Americanized conceptualizations of epistemology and ethics which were culturally and politically constructed. There is insufficient space in this chapter to explore these themes fully, but they are illustrated briefly below.

Situated epistemology. The rise of anthropological theory in the United States was accompanied by epistemological assumptions that tended to invalidate applied anthropology as a fully legitimate form of the discipline. A prime example was the widespread notion that ‘real’ anthropologists must conduct their ethnographic fieldwork outside the anthropologist’s native culture and language (Schwartzman 1993, Freidenberg 2001; see also Messerschmidt 1981). It was assumed that an anthropologist could not think outside the categories in which she was encluturated, and thus took too much for granted in her own society and could not properly ‘problematize’ a given phenomenon at home. Such assumptions guarded the gates of professional status and served to devalue anthropology focusing on contemporary problems, both in the U. S. and abroad. Through such epistemological assumptions “the criteria of what constitutes knowledge, what is to be excluded, and who is qualified to know” (Foucault 1971) were established, empowering the practice of ‘pure’ anthropology inside the discipline (a focus on abstract matters in small, relatively isolated ethnic groups) while disempowering ‘applied’ (a focus on contemporary problems). This created endless frustration for anthropologists working in the policy arena, where their work was viewed as that of ‘accountants’ or ‘technicians’ rather than producers of new knowledge (Hackenberg 1988). Anthropologists originating from the so-called Third World have sometimes criticized the ‘view from outside’ gained by nonnative anthropologists as narrow or biased (e.g., Puerto Rican anthropologists’ criticisms of the U.S. anthropology of Puerto Rico; see Freidenburg 2001). Yet, Western anthropologists rarely observed or expressed the view that Western epistemological assumptions might be culturally constructed. Indeed, these assumptions were taken for granted. In this invisible state, we believe a vertical relationship between theoretical and applied anthropology was furthered in the U.S. These assumptions seem to have gone by the wayside today, as Rabinow’s (1986:241) statement at the opening of this chapter suggests.
Culturally constructed ethics and politics. Prior to World War II, most American anthropologists, including applied anthropologists, skirted ethical concerns through their belief that they were scientists engaging in values-free research, and also by avoiding direct intervention or policy implementation. In this way, they resembled British anthropologists of the colonial era. American anthropologists did not always recognize their culture-specific values, such as not judging other cultures in the terms of one’s own culture (i.e., cultural relativism), and their values might have been viewed by some as universal ‘truth’.

The situation began to change during and after World War II, as American anthropologists became engaged in a wider array of roles that involving social change and intervention. Many social scientists came to realize that their research was not entirely objective or values-free (Holmberg 1958). The ethics of intervention in another person’s culture, while maintaining one’s responsibilities to multiple others (some with conflicting interests), was found to be fraught with moral contradictions. Minimizing the unanticipated consequences generally was the ‘prime directive’ (i.e., do no harm), but this invariably was the responsibility of the individual anthropologist, contingent upon the circumstances of the case, (Bennett 1996). Many anthropologists chose to avoid the inherent risks by avoiding practice altogether (thereby favoring ‘pure’ anthropology).

Serious academic efforts at cultural intervention were undertaken during the 1950s and 1960s, and these sparked debates that contributed to the construction of applied anthropology as an arena of questionable politics and ethics. Examples are Sol Tax’s Action Anthropology and Allan Holmberg’s Research and Development Anthropology (see Holmberg and Dobyns, 1962; Tax 1975, Bennett 1996). These academically-based projects framed intervention within the context of a set of values that were stated explicitly. Ultimately, however, both projects met with strong collegial criticism and failed to thrive or reproduce. Many observers believed that these projects were tinged with paternalism; it was the anthropologist who told indigenous people that they needed help, not the other way round. This latter critique related to an emerging, postcolonialist view in anthropology portraying applied anthropologists as colonialist and elitist (e.g., Thompson 1976; Bennett 1996). A rift was emerging between applied development anthropologists employed by governments or international aid agencies and postmodern academic anthropologists focusing on ‘development’ as an object of study. The latter often charged the former with seriously misguided or even ‘unethical’ practices (e.g., contributing to a continuing cycle of impoverishment in the so called Third World, enforced by developed economies and their agents; see Escobar 1995, Gardner and Lewis 1996.) Such criticisms had the tendency to reinforce earlier disciplinary biases against anthropological employment by powerful sponsors, lest the anthropologist become a target of attacks leveled against these employers (e.g., U.S. government or international aid agencies). Again, ‘pure’ was the safest position.

Through the foregoing epistemological, ethical, and political discriminations, anthropologists who applied knowledge to ‘real world’ problems,
whether academic or not, were often treated as ‘second-rate’, or even more harshly, as less worthy in bearing the name anthropologist (and, thus, some chose to leave their disciplinary identity behind). Applied anthropology in America had been transformed, from its potential role as an innovative and entrepreneurial partner of theory as envisioned by the founders of the SfAA, to the subordinate stepchild of a scholarly parent quick to criticize and slow to take responsibility for the consequences of its own intellectual production.

3. Expansion of the job market for applied anthropology in the U.S. As the culture of American academic anthropology was emerging during the mid-20th century, a series of parallel, but slower developments was shaping the community of professional practice associated with applied anthropology. As a result of the Great Depression and World War II, the demand for anthropologists grew beyond that of instructor/researcher/consultant in the arena of internal colonial administration (i.e., Native Americans), and came to encompass other arenas and roles, including interventionist roles related to policy implementation, social action, and culture change (van Willigen 2002). There were not many anthropologists available for such roles immediately after World War II. There were not many anthropologists available in the first place, and those that did exist were headed off to academic posts. Yet, the demand for applied anthropology was steady and growing due to numerous contextual shifts at the national and global levels (e.g., the creation of new federal legislation that required anthropological expertise, the establishment of international ‘development’ policy, capitalism’s search for new markets overseas). New anthropology Ph.D.’s who chose not to seek academic employment, plus ‘surplus’ PhDs who could not be accommodated within academia, gradually became available to fill the demand for anthropological knowledge in government and the private sector.

There came an important turn of events in the 1970s and 1980s. The supply of new anthropology Ph.D.’s who could not find academic employment, began to expand as a result of the shrinking academic job market. At their peak, anthropology departments in the United States produced 445 Ph.D.’s in 1976. Ten years later (1986), this number was 420; however, the number of new Ph.D.’s employed by an anthropology or joint department had fallen to 33 percent, and the percent employed by all of academia was only 51 percent of the total (as compared to 75 percent in 1971-72; Baba 1994). The rest found work in federal, state, and local governments (13 percent), the private sector (9 percent), museums (6 percent), and other venues (23 percent) [error due to rounding]. The ‘other’ category above likely included those who were unemployed or soon to leave the field entirely. The number of ‘other’ in 1971-72 was only 2 percent. Clearly, there was pressure on the discipline to shift its practices so that graduates could find meaningful ways to sustain themselves beyond academe.

During the postwar era, many significant changes were introduced within anthropology to support the flow of practitioner knowledge to government and private sector applications. Although this flow still is not fully acknowledged as a mainstream activity within American anthropology, it was a key element of the disciplinary shift toward practice, including structural developments that brought practice to what had been
a highly academic discipline. In this context, anthropology’s institutional adaptation in the U.S. included various named structures that responded to the growing demand for applied anthropology, such as the establishment of numerous applied anthropology degree programs and departments; local practitioners organizations (LPOs); the AAA’s founding of the National Association for the Practice of Anthropology (NAPA); the formation of the Coalition of Practicing and Applied Anthropology Programs (COPAA); new professional journals such as Practicing Anthropology and NAPA’s Bulletin series; and the list goes on (see for discussion van Willigen 2002, Hill 1994). Importantly, the production of applied anthropologists for venues external to the discipline required a cadre of anthropologists within academia. So, there emerged a group of academic applied anthropologists who reside full-time in higher education and yet focused on the production of applied anthropologists for destinations beyond the academy.

With the expansion and institutionalization of this ‘new applied anthropology’ (Angrosino 1976) in the 1970s and 1980s, a subtle shift occurred in the meaning of the term ‘applied.’ While the SfAA founders had in mind an innovative linkage of theoretical and practical objectives, the ‘new applied anthropology’ of the latter 20th century became something else. Depending upon one’s point of view, applied anthropology became a means to provide specialized knowledge to the policy realm, to train knowledge workers for employment, and to supply and established and growing source of knowledge for solving various practical problems. These new and expanded objectives are reflected in the definitions of applied anthropology appearing in the literature over the past two decades:

- Applied anthropology (is) the field of inquiry concerned with the relationships between anthropological knowledge and the uses of that knowledge in the world beyond anthropology (Chambers 1987:309).

- The term applied anthropology is used in both Britain and the United States to refer mainly to the employment of anthropologists by organizations involved in inducing change or enhancing human welfare (Bennett 1996:S25).

- We start out with our discussion of definition by simply saying that applied anthropology is anthropology put to use…It is viewed as encompassing the tremendous variety of activities anthropologists do now and have done in the past, when engaged in solving practical problems (van Willigen 2002:8).

The objectives set forth in these definitions are significant, and should be included within any conception of modern applied anthropology. What we question are the elements not found in the definitions. Only Chambers links applied anthropology to knowledge, and even then understanding is gained best through inquiry directed toward the uses of knowledge, apparently in venues beyond anthropology. Is there the possibility that applied anthropology could also contribute to the advancement of knowledge within anthropology and cognate fields, to the extension and revision of disciplinary theory, and to the development of innovations in social science methodology? Certainly, other applied fields in the social sciences (i.e., applied areas of economics, political science, psychology) and clinical professions (medicine) contribute...
to the knowledge base of their respective disciplines. To what extent is this contribution a possibility, even a responsibility, of applied anthropology? As the above definitions reflected, contributions to anthropological knowledge no longer appear to be explicit within the extant meanings of applied anthropology, and we believe that this shift has come at a cost. Bennett (who indicates that he does not consider himself an ‘applied’ anthropologist) flatly states:

The practical or applied side of academic fields in the human sciences is often viewed by scholars with ambivalence or even contempt…Anthropology has traditionally devoted itself to the study of tribal or nonurban societies, and this has meant that it has with difficulty accepted a role of practitioner…practical anthropology in American anthropology generally lacks prestige in scholarly circles. [1996:S23-24].

Indeed, a lack of prestige has translated into a lack of clout, which means that the ‘new applied anthropology’ has been weak as a policy discipline (Chambers 1987).

The foregoing suggests that the split between anthropological theory and practice, which originally occurred in Great Britain under colonialism, reemerged in North America following World War II. While the British produced only an incipient version of the two-tiered model of knowledge production (since applied anthropology did not thrive in the U.K. after World War II), this two-tiered model emerged in its mature form in the U.S. In this model, the production of theoretical knowledge is reserved for disciplinary elites, and applied anthropology is positioned in the ‘other’ tier, where its knowledge is considered derivative, less prestigious, and not a contributor to disciplinary theory. Of course, theorists may ‘apply’ anthropology if they choose, but the theoretical community generally does not take notice of work produced by those who are considered (only) applied anthropologists. The hegemonic economic power of the day (i.e., the U.S. at the end of the 20th century) utilizes this cognitive and institutional structure as a means to produce applied and practicing anthropologists for the expanded neocolonial enterprise, while maintaining a ‘pure’ theoretical structure to produce ideology for export (see also Baba 2000). The primary difference between the British and U.S. models is that the American version has been able to maintain a distinctive identity that is not coterminous (i.e., confined or bound) with indigenous, ethnic or tribal peoples, even though theoretical anthropology plunged into foreign fieldwork in exotic settings. The capacities to maintain a distinctive, named identity and contemporary focus, in part, enabled applied anthropology’s remarkable expansion in the United States over the latter half of the 20th century.

GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF ANTHROPOLOGIES: 1990-PRESENT

During the 1990s, boundaries within and between nations and regions established after World War II began to shift, blur or perhaps disappear, reflecting structural changes in the underlying economic and political relationships. These shifts were partially triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which
simultaneously disrupted the regional balance of powers and global political equilibrium since World War II. These shifts also opened up vast new areas of the globe for the advance of capitalism. The changes we describe here are referred to as part of a process of ‘globalization’ (Robertson 1992, Chun 2004). Globalization theories predict that increasing economic and technological interconnections across nations will encourage structural convergence, meaning that institutional forms will become increasingly similar and resonant over time. For example, formal institutions charged with an educational mission may be expected to restructure their programs along lines that permit graduates to meet implicit or explicit global standards (i.e., leading to greater similarity in program content across nations). We suggest that we are experiencing the effects of a convergence process within our discipline, both globally and across the domains of theory and practice.

The anthropologist Jonathan Friedman discusses global change in his book entitled Globalization, the State, and Violence (2003; see also Friedman 2004). According to Friedman, the phenomenon popularly referred to as ‘globalization’ represents the latest cycle in a long-term historical process of capital accumulation. In this process, geographic centers of capital accumulation shift regionally, with older centers gradually losing their prominence and newer centers rising and gaining power. Although one may debate whether all that Friedman describes is part of the capitalist era, one can be certain that geographic centers of political and economic power or hegemony have arisen and collapsed over the past hundred and thousand years. These shifts can be traced from the great trading centers of the Middle East, to the Italian city-states, through the various nations of Europe, and lastly to the United States after World War II. Now, capital accumulation may be shifting to the Pacific Rim, especially the Asian side. We are quoting Friedman, at some length, given the importance of the subject:

The rise of Europe itself was a process that can best be understood as in counterpoint with the decline of the Middle East at the end of the Middle Ages. Thus European capitalism did not simply evolve from feudalism. It was a product of the shift of accumulation from one world region to another. Europe was, in this argument, largely a dependent area in the previous Arab empires, a relation that was gradually reversed in the centuries following the Renaissance. The foremost mechanism in this process was and is the decentralization of capital within the larger system, a phenomenon that we refer to today as globalization (emphasis in the original). So the entire history of Europe, understood in global terms, can be seen in terms of a series of pulsations, expansions, and contractions, from the growth of the Mediterranean and Flanders as the Middle East entered into its terminal crisis to the shifts from the Italian city-states to Portugal and Spain, followed by Holland and then England. Each of these cycles was characterized by periods of centralized accumulation and expansive trade followed by decentralization (capital export or globalization) and a longer-term shift in hegemony. By the 1970s the entire West had become a major exporter of capital to much of the rest of the world and this might be seen as a major shift of accumulation from West to East. The formation of the Pacific Rim economy from the 1970s to the late 1990s represents a substantial redistribution of
economic power in the world system. This phase corresponds to the rise of the globalization idea and its institutionalization in the West (Friedman 2003:2).

In what appears to be a decline of the Western center and the rise of a new center in the East, the United States decreased its share of manufacturing from 40.3 percent to 24 percent between 1963 and 1987, while Japan increased its portion from 5.5 percent to 19 percent. The Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) countries of India, Spain and Brazil were the major benefactors of this decentering (Freidman 2004:76). Countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, and China have moved rapidly up the ranks of nations that export manufactured goods, at the same time that the Western nations have experienced declines, some by significant amounts. At present, the Pacific Rim nations have substantially higher rates of economic growth than the U.S. or Europe24. Of course, these rates reveal only one, potentially misleading, dimension of a complex situation. Still, it would be difficult to argue that the more mature (Western) economies are retaining their full sparkle for investment as they have become saturated with consumer products. Between 1978 and 1998, manufacturing exports to the U.S. increased from 17.8 percent to 31.8 percent. According to Freidman, the model is one in where exported capital is used to manufacture products that are reimported to the older center, with a ‘trend toward increasing competition, decentralization, and a clear shift of capital accumulation to the East’ (2004:76-77).

Furthermore, with the breakup of the Soviet bloc and socialism/communism’s economic model morphing toward market-oriented forms, new arenas for capitalist expansion have emerged in places that heretofore were forbidden territory (e.g., eastern Europe, Russia, China, and their client states). In addition, starkly visible are the ‘weak links’(e.g., failed African states) where order basically collapsed and anarchy may rule (Friedman 2003). Abhorrent conflicts there have converted millions of people into armies of refugees, creating severe humanitarian crises that have riveted anthropological attention, as well as spinning off intercultural encounters that have created occasions for postmodern theorizing (Fisher 2003). Such processes link peoples, nations, and regions together across the globe and create compelling foci for anthropological practice in the world today.

Globalization processes are salient in the present context because they have implications for the structuring of applied and practicing anthropology in the United States and around the globe. Our essay argues that the production of anthropological knowledge within the global hegemonic power (Great Britain in the past, more recently the U.S.) is structured in a two-tiered format, including a theoretical and an applied/practicing tier. This structure emerged during a prolonged period of colonialism and neocolonialism, when the world had Western geographic centers. Only within this structure ‘applied anthropology’ named as such. In this chapter, we have attempted to trace the historical developments surrounding the meaning of this name, and changes in its meaning over space and time. We suggest that if the world is in the process of de-centering—with Eastern or other non-Western powers on the rise, and the U.S. slowing losing its hegemonic status—then we might expect the structuring of anthropological institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere to reflect these shifts through a convergence process (particularly as resources are reallocated in a West-to-East pattern). Two
tentative hypotheses regarding globalization and the naming of applied anthropology may be advanced: (1) other nations will begin to develop institutional structures that resemble applied anthropology institutions in the U.S., and will name them as such; and (2) institutional structures in the U.S. will evolve in a manner that moves closer to the global norm (i.e., a blurring of the lines between theoretical and applied anthropology.

We believe that tendencies related to the first hypothesis (i.e., the naming of applied anthropology in other countries) have been attempted rather unsuccessfully in other nations. Three chapters (Canada, Great Britain, and Israel) in this volume provide evidence of formal institutional structures created to support a separate applied or practicing anthropology activity over the past decade or more (and some were named ‘applied anthropology’ or a similar term). In each case, the experiment failed to thrive or has been ended. At first glance, the failure of these models may appear contradictory, since all of them arose in ‘First World’ locales that seemingly should support a two-tiered system. However, we argue that only a global hegemonic power can support two tiers (e.g., Britain in the past, the United States at present). Each of the other national contexts (i.e., Canada, Israel, and Great Britain at present), is missing one or more critical elements needed for replication of a full-fledged, two-tiered institutional structure (e.g., economic or political resources to support two-tiers, a large market demand for applied anthropology, and a varied role structure). The failure of separate institutional structures in supporting applied anthropology and the end ‘applied’ name does not mean that the application of anthropology ended in those nations, the activity goes on without the separate structure or name, just as it has everywhere else except within a power center. Some anthropologists (not Americans) have confided to us their relief that efforts to establish an applied anthropology ‘apartheid’ in their country failed, because they believe applied activity should be integrated with theoretical anthropology. While the term ‘apartheid’ may seem startling and alien in this context, perhaps it is an apt characterization for institutional structures that segregate and discriminate on the basis of (what some believe to be) ‘inherent’ characteristics.

This brings us to hypothesis two: the potential ‘blurring’ of theoretical and applied anthropology. We believe, based on the evidence in this volume and other literature, that hypothesis two is the more possible result of globalization. A new global model of anthropology appears to be emerging that situates our discipline squarely in the world, blurring (but not eliminating) the distinctions between academic (‘pure’) and non-academic practice, as well as American and other national forms of the discipline. Fischer (2003) who has called for new conceptual and methodological tools needed because cultures of every kind are becoming more complex and differentiated as globalization brings them into exponentially increased interaction. He states that anthropology now operates in a series of ‘third spaces’ beyond the 19th and 20th-century dualisms of us/them, primitive/civilized, East/West, North/South, or applied/academic. The opening of a ‘third space’ gives rise to a peculiar sense of ‘oneness’ or a blurring of boundaries that anthropology has not evidenced since the dawn of the discipline. From our perspective, this ‘oneness’ is expressed through three dimensions of global convergence, described across several of the chapters in this volume.
These dimensions reflect aspects (i.e., features or outcomes) of institutional structures connected to anthropological practice (in its broadest sense) that appear to be emerging across nations and regions, including the United States. Three such aspects are described below: 1) a shift toward contemporary, problem-oriented interdisciplinary research; 2) participatory and collaborative methodologies; and 3) stronger profiles in policy-making and political influence. We believe that these phenomena result from globalization processes, that they influence both academic and nonacademic anthropology, and ultimately they will transform the U.S. model of applied anthropology, as well as its name(s). We discuss each of these dimensions in the sections that follow.

**A Shift in Academic Attention toward Contemporary Problem-Oriented Interdisciplinary Research**

We already have described some of the conditions that rivet anthropological attention toward urgent issues transcending national boundaries. This volume resonate with the themes focusing our colleagues’ interests, academic and non-academic, toward research relating to the global troubles of environmental devastation, violence, disease, homelessness, and hunger. These issues cannot be analyzed with traditional ‘pure’ disciplinary concepts and methods alone. While traditional anthropological practice (solo, single discipline, abstract, ‘exotic esoterica’) has been marginalized, the epistemological heart of our discipline is being transformed through postcritical approaches to methodology and theory-building (Schweizer 1998) which encompass interdisciplinary forays across new intellectual frontiers. The potential synergy of problem-focused, yet fundamental research is recognized across the natural and social sciences (Stokes 1997), and it is producing gains in cutting-edge areas such as environmental science, economic and ‘institutional’ anthropology and complex adaptive systems (e.g., Moran and Ojima 2005, Jian and Young 2002, Agar 2004). Lines between theory and practice are blurred in such contexts because emergent problems are poorly understood and not well theorized. Those with access to the field may gain information crucial to new understanding, while those cloistered in the realm of ‘pure’ may risk failure to comprehend evolving realities, since old theory is can be obsolete for dealing with contemporary issues. Importantly, gaining access to the field often requires an exchange of value (i.e., a problem orientation, a deliverable). Anthropologists need to transform knowledge gained in more pragmatic contexts into theoretical intelligence and not become disillusioned that such engagement is automatically ‘impure’ or represents a ‘sell out’ to the system.

This brings us to another consequence of global decentering and its tendency to prompt scholars’ attention toward contemporary issues: The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake may be affordable only by members of wealthy institutions. The most exclusive academic institutions may continue such pursuits because they are more or less financially independent, but public institutions relying on tax revenues, tuition fees, and income from grants and contracts must heed constituents’ calls for greater ‘accountability and relevance’, meaning a shift toward agendas resonating with stakeholder interests (see Duderstadt and Womack 2003). These changes in academia have fostered growing
pressures on academic researchers to deliver ‘products,’ much as if they were in the corporate world, and the rise of an ‘audit culture’ in higher education (Shore and Wright 2000), which we believe is a mechanism for resource reallocation that accompanies the global decentering of power.

We believe these contextual forces will trigger an entrepreneurial impulse defining this as a moment of opportunity for anthropologists to lead in an interdisciplinary effort (much as that seen prior to World War II). Such opportunities come with numerous consequences, including the need for changes in the training or retraining of students (and faculty) and in the orientation of anthropologists’ research goals and objectives. Over the long term, such influences may transform a discipline, bringing theorists closer to ‘real world’ problems and blurring the lines between theory and practice (see Jian and Young 2002).

Meanwhile, the so-called ‘institutional anthropologies’ (Bennett 1996) have emerged during the latter part of the 20th century, connecting anthropology to other disciplines and professions (e.g., medical anthropology, legal anthropology, educational anthropology, organizational anthropology, and so forth). Institutional anthropology has responded to the value brought by anthropological and ethnographic expertise across a wide array of modern professional domains (see Hill 1999, 2000). This ‘diaspora of anthropology’ has transformed many members of our discipline into intellectual hybrids coexisting simultaneously in anthropology and in other professional realms (e.g., medicine, business), from which they may come and go, being disciplinary and interdisciplinary at the same time. An interesting aspect of hybridity is that it requires integration from contemporary contexts, though a hybrid anthropologist may self-identify as theoretically oriented if she chooses (with respect to anthropological theory or to theory of another discipline). There is no requirement that an institutional anthropologist identify as an applied anthropologist, and many do not (though they focus on contemporary problems in other fields, as do applied anthropologists). We suggest that the institutional anthropologies in the U.S. have evolved a practice that resembles the model of applied anthropology originally conceived by the founders of the Society for Applied Anthropology prior to World War II (i.e., Bateson, Mead, Warner et al.), except that the anthropologists now do not belong to one professional society. Institutional anthropology, by remaining outside the fold of the ‘named’ (or by taking on many different names), converges toward what is happening in other parts of the world, where applied anthropology also is not named, and consequently contributes to the blurring of the boundary between theory and practice.

- **Participatory and Collaborative Methodologies**

   In this volume, the power of collaboration and participation is most clearly reflected in those chapters that discuss advances made in indigenous and aboriginal rights (e.g., self-determination, status recognition, jurisdiction, expansions of land, and treaty rights (see chapters on Ecuador, India and Russia). Advances in this area are impressive, and have involved collaboration among local peoples, anthropologists, NGOs, international agencies such as the World Bank and transnational corporations. These advances are the outgrowth of a historical process, beginning with the social movements
for equality and justice that traversed the globe in the 1970s and which ignited indigenous and aboriginal uprisings aimed at securing land rights and rights to self-determination. In some cases (e.g., Latin America), the uprisings had the effect of redefining the relationship between indigenous peoples and their states, often involving anthropologists in efforts to establish greater autonomy and more clearly defined economic rights for indigenous peoples (see chapter on Ecuador). Some of these efforts met with success, leading to legal and policy changes at the national level and improving the economic situation for indigenous peoples (see chapter on Russia).

A mechanisms for diffusion of successful innovations surrounding indigenous rights was documented by international agencies such as the World Bank. Toward the end of the 20th century, these agencies came under increasing pressure to produce positive economic results in the developing world. The chapters in this volume suggest that these agencies undertook projects focused on indigenous peoples and other ethnic groups, possibly as a means to demonstrate concrete results in limited cases, using methods adopted from applied anthropology (e.g., the case of ‘ethnodevelopment’ discussed in chapter on Ecuador; also see chapter on Russia). Some of these ‘win-win’ strategies, once proven effective, were codified by the international agencies, made available for dissemination. Thus, collaboration among anthropologists, indigenous peoples, other ethnic groups, and international agencies may have contributed to the emergence of a world model for constructive economic change now being adopted as a global standard. Based on our observations, this process may be more theoretically sophisticated and ethically robust than anything utilized to ‘manage change’ in the private sector today.

Lamphere (2004:431) anticipated the convergence of anthropological practices in the U.S. towards that of other nations and how collaborative methodologies can represent convergence for academic and nonacademic researchers as well:

Anthropology is in the midst of a “sea change.” This is a culmination of three decades of transformation in the communities we study, the topics that command our attention, and the relationships we forge with the subjects of our research…the relationships we have established with communities have been reshaped from that of outside experts and scientists studying “others” to more collaborative and partnership arrangements.

It is indeed a “sea change,” and an ironic one at that, when academically based anthropologists in the U.S. embrace participatory methodology, given the origins of this practice. While many streams of theory and practice contribute to the participatory tradition (Greenwood and Levin 1998, Wallerstein and Duran 2003), arguably the clearest commitment to the actual practice of community participation as a methodology arose from the work of Paulo Freire in Brazil. Through this, he intended to break the monopoly power of academic institutions over knowledge production and dissemination by changing the way in which poor people learned to read (Elden and Levin 1991, Taylor 1993). That this methodology would circle the globe and now find its way into American academe as an innovative approach to anthropological research is certainly a case study in globalization and convergence if ever there was one.
• **Stronger Profiles in Policy-Making and Political Influence**

The century-long involvement of anthropology in public policy was a central theme throughout the historical tour we conducted in this essay. In a world rapidly changing, public and private policy elites—especially Western elites whose hegemony is threatened—may experience unease and wish to get their hands on knowledge about the worlds beyond their immediate view. Anthropologists may lay claim to these unknown territories and, interestingly, they become welcome in many corridors of power where we were seldom seen before. Because anthropological knowledge is necessary to elites in this era of massive global change, it is our belief that the 21st century model of anthropology will enter the global centers of capital accumulation at higher levels of influence and authority than has been possible for almost a century. This shift is already happening on a worldwide basis, as discussed in this volume (see chapters on Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, Great Britain, Israel, and Russia; see for American examples see Hackenberg 2004). With this, a change is occurring within the discipline from the long-standing favored regard of abstract and esoteric knowledge, for its own sake, to a different focus on knowledge and practice that is more strategic and orientated toward critical concerns of society. Simply collecting knowledge of particular cultures leans toward isolation, while knowledge of urgent issues leans toward more connection and a global process. Because of these overall disciplinary shifts, anthropology will of necessity become more global in every aspect our work (e.g., convergence toward global standards in literature, methodology and practice). Those institutional structures and individuals who are capable of making this transition will be the creating the anthropology of the future (e.g., preparing students with methodological skills via some mechanism, not necessarily within academia). It may be knowledge of domains of practice and complementary approaches that will segment future anthropologists (e.g., knowledge of medicine, educational or other forms of policy), rather than dichotomies of the past, such as basic versus applied or commitment to a particular theory. Anthropologists will be allied with different kinds of cognate disciplines dependent on the defining issues and will concentrate on different regions of the globe and trans-global human communities where certain issues are more critical.

In summary, our overview of the evidence supports the view that anthropology in the United States is evolving toward a model of practice that tends to blur distinctions between ‘pure’ and applied, as well as one that creates new forms of the discipline with synergistic combinations of theory and practice in anthropology and cognate disciplines. Our explanation for this shift is turbulence in the global context, particularly the de-centering of the world, and resource reallocations. We postulate that periods of high turbulence and uncertainty dislodge stable theoretical regimes and create crises that call for empirical investigation and action. The Great Depression and World War II were times such as these, and the present is such a time. The ‘apartheid’ of theory and practice, forged in the old centers of power for rule under stable regimes, cannot stand under the present circumstances, for they block the global flows of knowledge needed to understand and to act. Anthropology is challenged to re-form itself under new conditions, and we must re-form ourselves to remain valid and dynamic (and to advance and, perhaps, become more valuable in the future).
TRANSFORMING OURSELVES: AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In the past, anthropologists created niches for themselves within the contexts of colonization and its critique. From the time of Boas, the majority of anthropologists, especially those in the West, found a comfort zone for their liberalism in the confines of academia. Although Boas and his students were concerned with ethnicity and salvaging ethnographic descriptions of vanishing indigenous groups for the sake of knowledge preservation, anthropology remained a small and relatively powerless discipline. Boas and his students developed a conceptual framework (relativism) and ideology (liberalism) for the discipline that continued to underpin anthropology throughout the 20th century. Perhaps, it was Horton (1973) who best characterized anthropology’s ‘romantic fascination’ with traditional cultures. He stated that anthropologists, for the most part, are equipped with ‘liberal scruples’ that allow us to avoid invidious intercultural comparisons (e.g., cultural relativism). To maintain relativism, however, required that anthropologists to avoid certain cultural comparisons or facts, creating (in our opinion) inadvertent disciplinary blind-spots. For example, although anthropologists long have underscored the centrality of consumption in the production of cultural patterns (e.g., Sahlins 1976, Douglas and Isherwood 1978), much of the 20th century passed with anthropologists ignoring consumption as a proper object of study because influential members of the discipline wanted to ‘protect’ traditional societies from the ‘contamination’ that may accompany such goods, as well as protecting anthropology from extinction should these goods replace traditional material objects (Miller 1995). Now that the importance of consumption has been acknowledged, reflection upon this shift suggests that the unintended effect of our self-interested ‘liberal scruples’ denied, in part, social realities. Our scruples gave us a one-eyed view of the world (ironically, the ‘self’ eye; the ‘other’ eye was covered), which contributed to the intellectual and political marginalization of anthropology in local and global contexts.

A significant dimension of global convergence is reflected in the alliances and transnational networks forged by anthropologists that, in many cases, require a 21st century ideology. Our theory and practice must reflect the new social and cultural restructuring of the world's political economy. While there is a place for ‘liberalism’ in our attitudes and actions, to advance we must recognize the emerging world’s differences from the ones that produced the ideals of the 20th century. Globalization processes do not always originate in the West, thus not all aspects of globalization are harmful from the perspective of others. Values pertaining to the preservation of ‘culture’, or to the ‘rights’ of the underclass and the poor, for example, need to be shifted into other ideological frameworks more in tune with truly global processes, not only ones that originate in Western societies. Global restructuring requires that anthropologists rethink their 20th century ideology, values, and constructs within a 21st century context. A major contribution of postmodern ideology has been the critiquing the ‘us-them’ distinction, and bringing the “other” more into the picture than did the older models permeating 20th century anthropology.

We contend that 21st century anthropology will revive the innovative vision of the founders of the Society for Applied Anthropology, producing expert knowledge and
skills that can integrate theory and practice, and in due course move the discipline away from a marginal position. Vital is the integration of theory and practice that will enhance our position in the global system and, we hope, counterbalance the tensions that threaten disciplinary integrity. We argued previously (Hill and Baba 2000), and vigorously reinforce the argument here, that the future of anthropology is firmly rooted in the theoretical and methodological issues that are emerging on the frontier of practice. This exciting and challenging frontier is rising now in a new global model that transcends our 20th century ideals, incorporates the most innovative aspects of our past, and advances new ideas that are emerging from a decentered world.
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1. An exception was Foster (1969), who also reviewed the development of applied anthropology in Mexico and made limited mention of applied activities in Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, the Philippines, India and Italy. Gardner and Lewis (1996) discuss in some detail the development of applied anthropology in the UK.

2. We hasten to point out here that we do not believe that the difference derives from any difficulty in translating the concept ‘applied anthropology’ into other languages and cultural contexts. The basic notion of using anthropological knowledge toward practical aims has proven remarkably fluid in crossing cultural boundaries, as made clear in observations by Foster (1969), Bastide (1973), Kuper (1983), Gardner and Lewis (1996), Friedenberg (2001) and virtually all of the chapters in this volume and the previous one.

3. Although these terms may now be obsolete, we deliberately maintain their use in this context for purposes of historical comparison.

4. Here, we use the term ‘practice’ in reference to the practices of the entire discipline of anthropology, including those of anthropologists who do not consider themselves practitioners in the sense of ‘applied’ practice (e.g., ethnographic field work practices).

5. The British anthropologist Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers used the term ‘applied anthropology’ as early as 1881 (Gardner and Lewis 1996).

6. Kuper (1983) disputes the notion that indirect rule played any objective role in facilitating a ‘functional’ contribution from anthropology to British colonialism. However, he notes that the anthropologists themselves supported indirect rule, and that is the point in this context; (i.e., that the anthropologists and the colonial administrators colluded in their belief that indirect rule was an effective approach, and that participant-observation was functionally suited to this approach).

7. The first ethnology departments in Russia were formed after 1917, showing the importance of the discipline to the Soviet Union.

8. Whether or not the hypothesis advanced for the Russian case also may be applied to the Chinese case is not known at this time.
9. The term ‘native anthropologists’ is used throughout the chapter to refer to anthropologists who study people in their own country or culture of origin. This term is problematic, however; for example, when used to describe anthropologists in the U.S., it incorporates at least two (and potentially many more) kinds of anthropologists: whites and Native Americans, in the case of this chapter. The point here is that European and U.S. anthropologists (outsiders) held a near monopoly on the study of peoples in developing nations, but that began to change as ‘native anthropologists’ from those nations were educated for this purpose.

10. In fact, these policies did not achieve their intended goals, as is noted in the next section. Freidenburg (2001) has pointed out that acculturation-based policies often had the effect of increasing class stratification in indigenous communities, by drawing indigenous people into labor-intensive industries outside the community.

11. Angrosino (personal communication, 2005) makes the valid point that First World academic or theoretical anthropologists often are not purely theoretical in the sense that physicists might be, since their grounding in fieldwork gives them a strong orientation to ‘real world’ issues.

12. Later in the 1930s, the Office of Indians Affairs, together with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, engaged in a major natural resource survey involving anthropologists that emphasized the ‘adjustment’ of Native American attitudes to dominant American values (Gardner and Lewis 1996).

13. It is significant that the SfAA was founded prior to America’s entry into WWII, since the war often is credited with crystallizing the modern form of applied anthropology in America. We suggest, however, that this modern form was crystallized before the war, out of conditions existing during the 1930s (e.g., the Great Depression).

14. Another potential factor influencing the SfAA founders could have been a ‘multidisciplinary moment’ within the social sciences, especially prominent at Harvard through the intellectual leadership of Talcott Parsons. Clyde Kluckholn, one of the major leaders in anthropology at the time, was involved in this effort, and according to Bennett (1996:S26), he “simply did not draw a clear distinction between applied and pure.”

15. As a result of such criticism, some colonies and former colonies became hostile ground for anthropologists, even until recently in certain cases. Third World ‘native anthropologists’ also faced criticisms in their own countries for collaborating with the colonial project. Attacks on colonial anthropology do not acknowledge that some colonial-era anthropologists voiced sharp criticism against their governments (for examples, see chapters on India and Portugal in this volume).

16. In retrospect we can see that both ‘pure’ and applied anthropology in Europe were intimately associated with colonialism, although ‘pure’ attempted to distance itself by ‘forgetting’ its association with, and denying the existence of, the other ‘applied’.

17. Some observers were harsh in their criticism of the turn taken toward theory:
“…something has obviously happened in the last two decades and not to the good…Anthropology has developed its own restrictive taboos, its own little culture, and has been surrounded, if not strangled by it. It has developed status symbols which proliferate trivia and, even worse, the quest for trivia as a status symbol in the profession” (Nader 1975:31-32; c.f., Bennett 1996:S27).

18. It should be noted that in the 1940s and 1950s some anthropologists (including a number of those who participated in formation of the SfAA) were involved in the Human Relations School, where the research agenda focused on improvement of workforce productivity in American industry (Baba 2005). Because these projects required cooperation with company management, they often were viewed with suspicion in academic circles, and even labeled “politically reactionary” (Bennett 1996:S24). Such views contrasted unfavorably with the “decent, liberal reformist anthropology” that supposedly was represented in the mainstream of the discipline (Bennett 1996:S37), and this further contributed to the cultural construction of application as a politically problematic category.

19. Indeed, cultural relativism is relative itself. We make ethical judgments about human behavior in our ethnographic fieldwork on a regular basis, and if we did not, we could find ourselves in conflict with institutional review boards. In a time when the world is rapidly changing, where boundaries are collapsing and people are thrown into close juxtaposition in unexpected ways, it is difficult to implement the principle of cultural relativism as if human beings lived inside hermetically sealed bubbles of cultural (in)difference. Such shifts in the context of anthropological practice mean that the willingness of applied anthropologists to suggest that some methods or outcomes may be preferable to others does not seem so alien now as it once did in the middle of the 20th century.

20. Of course, today we recognize that even ‘pure’ research represents an intervention if human subjects are involved, no matter how tangentially, and that we cannot avoid our ethical responsibilities in such research.

21. Following World War II, the concept of ‘development’ arose in the Western world as a means to address the perceived problems of economic ‘underdevelopment’ in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Policy elites of the United States were leaders within the development movement, but soon the entire Western policy establishment joined, convincing newly elected leaders of independent Third World nations to sign-on to the West’s culturally constructed prescriptions for economic growth (Escobar 1995). As this movement developed force, American anthropologists gained opportunities to work jointly with international agencies and the U.S. armed forces to ‘modernize’ the nations of the Third World, an integral component of the emerging U.S. economic hegemony of the mid 20th century. As development agencies were evolving their policies, the peoples of the ‘underdeveloped’ nations became poorer and more desperate. Leading intellectuals in the Third World opened a strong critique of development, beginning in the 1970s with dependency theory. Dependency is a Marxist and world-systems influenced theory that claims ‘underdevelopment’ is a direct consequence of peripheral nations’ economic dependency upon capitalism and the exploitation of Western core nations (Peet...
While dependency theory itself has been severely criticized from various perspectives, the critique that it launched was only the opening round in a long and mounting global push-back against the concept of ‘development’, which was gradually joined (later in the 1980s) by many other forces, including anthropologists who study development as a subject of inquiry.

22. Earlier, during the Vietnam era, the discovery that the United States military was attempting to recruit anthropologists to work in covert counterintelligence operations overseas created a furor, and led to the American Anthropological Association’s ban on conducting any research that could not be published openly. This ban, part of the AAA’s Principles of Professional Responsibility (1971), virtually outlawed proprietary research in anthropology until the principles were changed during the 1990s.

23. Chambers (1987) notes several other factors that have inhibited the development of applied anthropology in America, some of which relate to culturally constructed views of ethics and values in the discipline.

24. For example, the The Economist (October 29, 2005:104-06) shows that GDP (gross domestic product) rates for Pacific Rim and other South East Asian nations over one year previous were listed as: China (9.4% +), Hong Kong (6.8% +), India (8.1% +), Indonesia (5.5% +), Malaysia (4.1% +), Philippines (4.8% +), Singapore (6.0% +), South Korea (3.3% +), Taiwan (3.0% +), Thailand (4.4% +). This compared with a GDP of 1.1% + for the Euro area and 3.6% + for the United States over one year previous.

25. In Canada, the Society for Applied Anthropology in Canada and its organ, Proactive, have ceased to exist. The applied anthropology graduate program that was piloted at the University of Saskatchewan also could not be sustained due to program downsizing. In Great Britain, the British Association for Anthropology in Policy and Practice and its successor have collapsed. In Israel, the applied anthropology track in the Department of Behavioral Science at Ben-Gurion University has been closed. It should be noted, however, that ‘Anthropology in Action’ still exists in Great Britain as an e-mail discussion group, and that since 2003 the ASA has initiated ‘Apply’, which is an applied anthropology network that is active in promoting applied events and has its own website. In our view, these latter activities do not reflect the same degree of formalization as those institutional structures that have failed.

26. American examples of these dimensions of convergence may be found in a series of issues published by Practicing Anthropology (Hackenburg and Hackenburg 2004), and in our own work.

27. This shift perhaps only reinforces a long-standing tendency within anthropology to claim that increases in knowledge and awareness of ‘other ways of being human’ would enhance tolerance, mitigate conflict, and promote social well being. From this standpoint, anthropology always has had a ‘purpose’, albeit a secondary one after the pursuit of knowledge.
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