APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE POST-VIETNAM ERA: ANTICIPATIONS AND IRONIES

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INTRODUCTION

One of the more revealing remarks concerning applied anthropology has been offered by Claude Lévi-Strauss (141) who, while suggesting that applied work ought to be considered the most important aim of the discipline, confessed that he had little personal interest in the subject. Applied endeavor in anthropology is typically viewed as lacking in intellectual rigor, ethically suspect, unimaginative, bereft of theoretical sophistication, and somehow essential to our future. Unfortunately, it has been our tradition to approach applied anthropology as an attitude or employment opportunity, rather than as a major subfield in its own right. This means that application is almost inevitably viewed as a partial and dependent expression of discipline, generally a use of some other perhaps "purer" inquiry, or at best as a "real world" stimulus for the more profound labors of theoreticians and basic researchers. To the extent that this is held to be true, both general anthropology and our applied concerns are left wanting—the one with no way to express its practicality, and the other with no way to advertise its rigor.

This observation leads me to a definition of applied anthropology as the field of inquiry concerned with the relationships between anthropological knowledge and the uses of that knowledge in the world beyond anthropology. While applied anthropologists are properly interested in the outcomes of their work (ranging through such professional issues as the employment of their colleagues and the public good of their endeavors), I maintain that the discipline of applied anthropology ought to be expressed as a scholarly,
critical, and reasonably objective concern for what happens when our knowledge enters the realm of practice. Applied anthropology offers in its own right a model for basic and theoretical inquiry, and should be accorded the same distinction as any of our four traditional subfields.

This claim is barely made possible by the current surge of popularity enjoyed by applied anthropology. For most of the brief history of our discipline, application has been subordinate to other concerns. Even today, we seem more concerned with the opportunities occasioned by applied work than we are with the status of applied anthropology as a general field of inquiry. My definition is premature, but perhaps we are better guided in this case by anticipation than we are by precedence.

Current interest in applied anthropology in the United States is reflected in the appearance of two new texts (38, 242), several edited volumes (74, 165, 225, 263), and a considerable literature devoted to areas of topical interest within the field.¹ One major problem in assessing applied anthropology has been that some of its most interesting material, and certainly the bulk of its production, is contained in reports and documents, as well as interdisciplinary articles, which rarely find publication or mention in anthropology journals. A library collection of these materials, housed at the University of Kentucky, has begun to serve as a remedy to this situation, resulting in a bibliography (239) and regular reporting of its accessions in the publication Practicing Anthropology.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTITUDES

Little attention has been paid to the historical development of applied anthropology. The most comprehensive recent contribution is that of Goldschmidt & Sanday (90), an edited volume dealing primarily with the applied work of United States anthropologists during the 1930s through the 1950s. Both van Willigen (242) and Eddy & Partridge (74) have provided chapter-length summaries, and there are a number of earlier discussions (cf 14, 130, 246). By and large, the history of applied anthropology has been written with not much more than a nod to the social and political contexts of its development—a significant weakness in a field which is clearly molded to such contexts.

¹ Except where a historical precedent seemed necessary, I have limited this review to work done during the past ten years. Even so, I have barely touched the surface of the material available in applied anthropology. In the selection of citations, I have favored material that offers a general statement about applied anthropology in one or another area of endeavor. The large number of such statements available is itself testimony to our widespread “anticipation” of applied work. I am grateful to Setha M. Low for her reading of an earlier version of this article and for her valuable suggestions.
If we cannot divine a future for applied anthropology solely from the past, we can yet find clues to our present situation in an understanding of the way our discipline has typically regarded applied work. In the United States, anthropology began to be recognized as a profession at a time when the relationship between knowledge and its uses seemed clear and direct. We are, on the one hand, heirs of the progressive, government-reform movement of the past century and, on the other hand, descendents of the somewhat more radical indigenous peoples protectionist leagues that flourished at the close of the Victorian era. The former experience has led us to the belief that there is a direct relationship between positive, scientifically acquired knowledge and human progress (22, 152). The latter roots have encouraged us to persist in feeling that we have, apart from our obligation to science, a special responsibility for the welfare of the kinds of people we have most typically studied (201). These two aims have seemed compatible for most of our history. Unfortunately, the combination of a positivistic social science and a humanistic impulse for reform has made it difficult for us to realize that knowledge of a special kind might be required to bridge the gaps between intent and action.

Prior to the 1970s, the greatest wave of popularity for applied anthropology occurred just before, during, and after World War II. Much of this work was done on a part-time, consulting basis by academically employed anthropologists, or in response to wartime emergencies, and usually during the early stages of an anthropologist’s career. These conditions resulted in a fairly clear work style. For the most part, the applied anthropology of this period favored basic research, eschewed participation in decision-making (15b), and discouraged a career commitment to work outside academia (78, 91, 163). A particular genre of reporting the results of applied work developed during this time. This style tended to be conservative in its value orientation (24a, 39), favored Weber in its strict separation of scientific inquiry and political involvement (220), and reflected the short-term involvement of anthropologists in most applied activity. To this day, the typical applied “story” demonstrates how anthropology might be used to explore the weaknesses of a policy or course of action but seldom provides adequate information regarding the short- or long-term consequences of the involvement of anthropologists in practical endeavors.

As much as World War II represented a boom time for applied anthropology in the United States, the Vietnam era did not. During the years prior to our country’s direct involvement in Vietnam, anthropology enjoyed unprecedented growth in its academic sector, and during our involvement serious issues concerning the use of social science by the “establishment,” and most particularly by the intelligence branches of our government (110, 258), served to dampen whatever enthusiasm the profession had left for applied work.
Still, the era left a significant part of the coming generation of anthropologists as disenchanted with the presumption of neutrality on the part of academic institutions as they were suspicious of their political leaders. Ironically, the very conditions that made work outside academia seem disreputable contained the seed of its moral necessity.

Within the profession at large, the strongest practical incentive to a renewed receptivity toward application has been a decline in opportunities for academic employment. For the cynics among us, this is often offered as the only reason for our rather dramatic change of heart. This is a wrong conclusion that negates the full promise of anthropology and unfairly (because it is so often based on disinterest rather than serious consideration of the recent work of applied anthropologists) calls to question the integrity of a considerable new generation of colleagues.

MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO APPLIED WORK

One major contribution of anthropology to applied work is the *ethnographic method*, which offers a means to in-depth, site-specific understanding that is rare in most applied social research. Ethnographic inquiry has been commissioned by government agencies since before the turn of the century. Until recently this work has been almost exclusively devoted to culturally distinct minority populations. Attempts to apply the ethnographic method more generally, to a wide variety of domestic policy situations, have increased during the past 15 years. These efforts, usually described as "qualitative" or "case-study" research, have not been without controversy. They have sometimes been criticized by policymakers as lacking focus (169) and by other applied researchers (32, 232) as naive in their approach to policy analysis.

There has been a tendency to think of applied ethnography as encompassing any approach to observation research (cf 244). Wolcott (253) has, on the other hand, argued that even in application the term ethnography ought to be reserved for inquiry that is directed toward understanding cultural phenomena, thereby preserving a link between the major theoretical and methodological concerns of the discipline. Agar (3) goes a step further in connecting ethnographic research to a particular kind of cultural problem and to an expected outcome. He views ethnography as "an encounter among different traditions" that have experienced communication "breakdowns":

A breakdown initiates a process of "resolution" where knowledge needs to be changed—perhaps trivially, perhaps in a fundamental way—before understanding can occur. Resolution is a dialectic, emergent process resulting in some new knowledge that bridges the original gap between the traditions. When it is accomplished, the social action
that originally elicited the breakdown becomes "coherent." The original difference is adequately connected to the similarities among the traditions so that understanding can occur.

Another major contribution of anthropology to applied work is found in the concepts of *culture* and *culture process*. In the same way as Agar describes ethnography, applied anthropologists have begun to move from a sense of culture tied to the analysis of distinct traditions to an interest in the processes of cultural exchange between "traditions" or groups—a time honored concern of anthropology, to be sure, but one that assumes a current relevance in applied anthropology's sense of mediation between cultural understandings and in our focus on the analysis of events rather than places (38, 165).

Besides research, one way anthropology's commitment to ethnography and cultural process has been expressed in applied anthropology is in the training of students in other professions. Anthropologists are, for example, involved in teaching ethnographic modes of discovery in medical schools (67, 228b), education departments (255), schools of agriculture (193), planning and design programs (147), and business schools (209). The intent of this instruction is not so much to train ethnographers as it is to enhance the observational and interpretive skills of professionals who typically work in a variety of cultural situations. The comparative and cross-cultural approach of anthropology is also an important part of these efforts although it is, with some exceptions (cf 172, 190b), less a feature of other styles of applied research and practice.

While applied anthropologists retain a strong interest in the qualitative aspects of ethnographic inquiry, many have committed themselves to quantitative analysis. Perhaps more than at any time before, applied anthropologists are now likely to select a research approach in relation to the problem before them rather than out of preference for a particular method of inquiry. Interest in combining qualitative and quantitative approaches to applied research has recently included attention to the potential of method "triangulation" (231) and the promises of approaches that seek integration between micro and macro levels of analysis (61).

As the roles of applied anthropologists have expanded to include participation in administration, planning, and decision-making, so have we seen an increased interest in connecting these kinds of activity to the experiences and insights of the discipline (cf 167). Anthropologists engaged in this kind of work often cite their cross-cultural skills and schooling in the virtues of holism, relativism, and empathy as having been especially important factors in their career development. These values have no doubt played a part, but there is a danger in assuming they are unique to anthropology at this level of practice. It does not seem reasonable to take what we have fashioned from the intellectual currents of our time into a particular strategy of research, return
those values to a world of practical skills, and then claim that they are ours alone. While such attempts might help us explain ourselves to each other, they do little to inform the rest of the world of the manner in which anthropologists contribute to nonresearch modes of practice.

**TOPICAL DIVISIONS OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY**

The diversity of applied anthropology is apparent in the almost inexhaustible ways by which the field is divisible into topical areas of interest. Some of these areas—such as health care, education, and development—reflect sustained involvement on the part of anthropologists. Other areas have developed more sporadically, although several of these have lately emerged or reappeared to show considerable potential.

In medical anthropology, there are a number of available texts (81, 159) and readers (18, 145), major reviews (80, 260, 264), and teaching resource materials (105, 229). There has recently been a significant increase in the number of anthropologists employed directly by medical schools and health-care facilities—a phenomenon defended by some (14) and criticized by others (251) as threatening further fragmentation of the field and leading to a "replication of the medical division of labor" within medical anthropology. The issue is an important one for applied anthropology, with medical anthropology serving as a harbinger for all.

Clinically applied medical anthropology, demonstrating the uses of anthropology in medical institutions, has emerged as an important focus for research and commentary (5, 24b, 43, 121, 140). Other current emphases within the field include research devoted to the political economy of health and health-care policy (171, 210); the utilization of traditional medical treatments in health care (6, 223); and work in nutrition (120, 122, 164, 173, 179, 190a), mental health (135b), infectious diseases (92, 117, 158), fertility (99, 172), oral rehydration therapy (55, 132), medical education (67, 228b), aging (129, 212), and the development of biocultural approaches to understanding health problems (123, 252).

Anthropologists specialized in education have successfully introduced ethnographic methods into the general research strategy of this topical area (73, 155, 255, 257). By the same token, some educational anthropologists have become outspoken critics of the tendency for qualitative and ethnographic methods to be applied uncritically to education research, with little attention paid to the relationships between method and theory, or to the effectiveness of ethnography in promoting usable research for decision-making (102, 197, 253). Important ideological issues pertaining to the interests served by research in educational anthropology have been raised by Cazden (35), countered by Kleinfeld (135a), and debated at some length (256).
Recent research and practice emphases within educational anthropology include work in multicultural education (88a, 125), the use of ethnography in the evaluation of education programs (23, 64, 77), issues related to teaching anthropology at both the college (192) and precollege level (206), and work in the "ethnography of schooling" (216, 217), learning processes (254), bilingual education (9, 31), and school administration (16).

The great part of the applied work done during the 1940s and 1950s was in the area of development, which is represented in its own right by a large variety of expertise and special interests, most of which are bound together by a common concern with economic indexes of social betterment and change. Development anthropology continues as a strong area of topical specialization. It is currently represented by two recently published texts (36, 93) and a training manual (180). Recent work has focused on such areas as agricultural development (15a, 27, 45, 46, 93, 108, 111, 185), farming systems research (29, 60, 124, 143, 175, 243), land settlement (144) and resettlement (98, 204, 205), fisheries (139, 178), capital formation (70), multinational banking and development (57), and ethnoecological aspects of development (186).

In contrast to the three areas discussed above, urban anthropology has failed to develop a strong applied component in its own right, although anthropologists have been drawn to a variety of urban situations and problems, including work in urban design and planning (33, 100, 101, 148, 191, 261), housing (37, 156, 233), urban pathologies (218), and the delivery of urban services (219). The difficulties of envisioning an applied urban anthropology demonstrates the degree to which applied work reflects in its organization the policy priorities to which it responds. In a country that has never had a clear urban policy, efforts to conceptualize work in this area remain scattered and unfocused.

There are a variety of other kinds of specialization in applied anthropology. After several decades of neglect, anthropologists have revived an interest in business and industry (12, 87, 109), particularly in the areas of international business (207), labor and occupation (4, 86), and industrial development (184). Other interest areas include work in human and social services (95, 96, 170), population (106, 166), energy research (127, 131), applied folklore (113, 189), cultural and historic preservation (56, 112), museums (176), and applied legal anthropology (54, 195).

Although applied anthropology is most often allied with the interests of social and cultural anthropology, the other three traditional areas of the discipline are represented. In the United States, federal and regional legislation designed to protect archeological resources has resulted in a major change of focus and occupational development within archeology (134, 160). There is growing interest in the applied aspects of anthropological linguistics and
cognitive studies (2, 72, 89, 227) and in applied physical anthropology (252). The concerns of application present an opportunity, largely untried, to explore again the common ground of the four traditional subfields of anthropology.

The development of topical areas within applied anthropology encourages communication among like-minded colleagues but also inhibits communication across interest boundaries. This is a concern shared throughout anthropology, and perhaps in most disciplines. Institutional incentives toward unity, proffered by most of our major professional organizations, have met with only occasional success.

We might hope for greater insight into this problem. The answer need not hinge on an attempt to reduce specialization, but might rather focus on general themes that challenge the boundaries of our current interests. The field has addressed such themes in the past—for example in a literature devoted to the introduction of new technology (20, 79, 213) and the training of change agents (8, 91). In our time, benefit could also be had from exploring such cross-interest themes as our involvement in the training of professionals in other fields, various settings of clinical application, and common strategies for applied research.

APPLIED RESEARCH STRATEGIES

Of all the distinctions to be made, the most awkward by far is between basic research, which has practical relevance, and applied research, which is directed to decision-making. Both are a necessary part of applied anthropology, and I have argued elsewhere (40) that both are vital to the dynamic of a complex society. Basic research should challenge our wisdom and probe our motives at every turn, and applied research helps us manage and predict outcomes once a course of action has been chosen. Although any distinction between basic and applied research has a tendency to fade at its edges, the three strategies discussed below fall most often within the realm of applied research.

The term social accounting can be applied to any applied research project that has as its primary goal the measure of a current situation. Decision-making, which requires that we match limited resources to seemingly limitless needs and desires, is improved when we have reliable ways to estimate demands and locate resources. Examples of social-accounting research conducted by anthropologists (often as participants in interdisciplinary research teams) include “needs assessments” and “baseline” studies designed to determine specific needs or conditions within a locale—for example, a major fieldwork project in Papua New Guinea was conducted to determine procedures of customary law that might be incorporated in that country’s reform of its legal system (195), and Glenn Smucker (211) conducted a “feasibility
study” of reforestation options in Haiti that was based on understanding the importance of charcoal production in the peasant economy. In the same vein, the US Agency for International Development routinely requires “social soundness analysis” as a part of its determination of the suitability of development projects (119, 162).

“Resource assessment” is another approach to social-accounting research. Examples of the participation of anthropologists in this kind of work include a project devoted to identifying indigenous resources that could be relied upon to further a health education project begun in Cameroon (28), and research in Swaziland designed to determine the number of traditional healers in that country and to assess the practicality of involving these individuals as health paraprofessionals (94). Anthropologists have also been involved in “social indicators research,” which is designed to determine criteria that might be used to monitor and assess social change over time (128, 238). In some of this work, anthropologists have offered valuable demonstrations of the ways cultural biases shape our society’s determination of both the criteria of “need” and the definition of “resource” (47, 119, 128, 238).

A second major strategy of applied research is evaluation. Here, the emphasis is on assessing an intervention that has occurred in the past in order to determine how well it has performed in relation to expectations, and perhaps to uncover any unintended consequences. Evaluation research techniques include qualitative (182) approaches that are especially responsive to ethnographic modes of inquiry. In recent years, anthropologists have participated in major evaluations of new and experimental programs in housing (37, 233), education (77), health (30), welfare (234), community development (136), and technology transfer (26). Although most reports on these activities are positive, some anthropologists have felt uncomfortable working within the regimen of large-scale, “bureaucratic” research (44, 245). One especially promising tendency, so far limited to work in international development, has been the “reevaluation” of evaluation reports, in which anthropologists have attempted to arrive at general statements concerning the validity and quality of social and cultural analyses included in program evaluations (25, 116).

“Social impact assessment,” “risk analysis,” and the “cultural appraisal of impacts” are all examples of a third strategy of applied research—social forecasting. Here, the effort is to determine what is likely to happen in the future if a particular course of action is followed. The large part of this work is supported by government action and legislation designed to preserve the environment, protect human resources, and mitigate the human costs of interventions. Accordingly, much of the research is devoted to issues of natural resource exploitation, such as planning for an oil pipeline in Alaska (62, 63), locating a site for a power project on Indian lands (232), planning for large-scale energy resource exploitation in the western United States
(236), or measuring the impacts of large-scale international development assistance programs (119).

While impact assessments are generally commissioned by the agencies or companies planning interventions of this kind, anthropologists have also been involved in seeking alternatives to "official" social impact assessments where they feel these standard reports are inadequate. For example, Gjording (88b) has prepared an alternative, critical report on the impacts of a mining project in Panama, Jorgensen (126) has been involved in research and testimony related to the adequacy of social impact assessments involving Indian groups in the United States, and Howell (112) has argued that many current approaches to social impact assessment fail to anticipate risks to cultural and historical resources. Interesting work has also been done in attempting to measure the "post impacts" of projects over a long period of time. These have included a 30-year retrospective of the health and ecological impacts of a dam constructed in Mexico (173) and a review 50 years later of the human impacts of a New Deal program for land reallocation in rural Alabama (234).

Although most of our understanding of anthropological contributions to applied research is based on experience related to public-sector initiatives, equal possibilities exist in private-sector research. Baba (12) has recently described the activities of several anthropologists involved in applied research related to problems in marketing, product design, and employee relations. Anthropologists have also worked with corporate clients in research devoted to problems of culturally appropriate design (100, 148).

The strategies for applied research described above are distinguished by their relation to time—whether they are most concerned with events and conditions in the present, past, or future. The distinction I make between basic and applied research is countered by two other arguments. These are van Willigen's (240) portrayal of applied research as one end of a "feedback loop" to basic, theoretical science; and Schensul's (199) suggestion that policy goals are the equivalent of theoretical statements, which is to claim that the aim of applied research and action is to test policy goals as though they were theories. There is value in both these views, but I feel they err in two ways. First, they are based on the assumption that the ultimate aim of applied research should be to test theory. I do not believe this is correct. The ultimate and primary aim of applied research is to help people make decisions of the moment. Second, both arguments yield to the tempting claim that theoretically based research should ideally be the foundation of social policy and program decision-making. This is a legacy of positivism that discounts the important roles played in decision-making by mixes of ideology and values, by prospect and fantasy, and even by chance. Since I am convinced that a truly "scientific" society, built solely upon the results of scientific inquiry, would only serve to inhibit human choice and narrow our potential, these
arguments remain unconvincing to me. Scientific, empirical investigation should inform decisions of the kind we are considering in this review; it will never make such decisions for us.²

IS THERE A GENERAL APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY?

The diversity of application in anthropology might lead us to the conclusion that there is no general sense of discipline, but only scattered provinces of opportunity. The several topical subfields and strategies for applied research provide a kind of coherence but seem to mitigate against arriving at a larger, more comprehensive sense of the field as a whole. There have been two attempts to define a general direction for applied anthropology—one of these centers on anthropology as an abstract (i.e. generalizable) policy science and the other on the advocacy and collaborative dimension of applied work.

Several anthropologists (48, 107, 224, 242, 248) have proposed that applied anthropology be defined as a policy science. The tradition goes back at least as far as Malinowski (152) and has deep roots in the founding of applied anthropology as a distinct entity (42, 133, 214). These are largely prospective critiques that are moderately-to-highly critical of our profession’s unwillingness or inability to contribute to public policy. Weaver (248) summarizes the issue neatly:

Some reasons for anthropology’s ineffectiveness are an unfamiliarity with the politics, administration and the nature of policy formulation, ignoring contemporary social issues, poor communication about the value and application of anthropology, lack of experience in dealing with administrators and politicians, a desire to preserve Indian cultures, failure to understand inconsistencies in federal policy, having different models of society and social action from those of decision makers, and a misunderstanding of the place of research in policy science.

The model of applied anthropology as a policy science places emphasis upon the potential of anthropological inquiry to contribute responsibly and in a broad perspective to the understanding of social issues. However, at this level, some of the current assessments seem overly critical, as Goldschmidt & Sanday (90) have suggested. Anthropologists have made significant contributions to our understanding of contemporary human problems. These include

²These are crucial distinctions and they are easily misunderstood. To say that the ultimate aim of applied research is to help make decisions is simply to acknowledge applied research in relation to the primary events that call it into play. This is not to say that links have not and should not be made between applied research and general theory, but only to argue that the conduct of applied research is not dependent on establishing such relationships. Similarly, when I claim that “positivism” has led us to an incorrect set of assumptions concerning the relationship between knowledge and its uses I am not suggesting that we abandon the methods of inquiry normally associated with empirical social science. I am simply questioning the tradition which declares that objective scientific inquiry will someday free us from the tyranny of our prejudices.
research and commentary that have helped inform many current policy problems, such as debate related to the “culture of poverty” (142, 237), Spradley’s work on urban nomads (218), Stack’s critique of public-welfare (219), and Agar’s work on drug abuse treatment (1) and the effects of deregulation of the trucking industry (4). Each of these is an example of basic research that is policy relevant. Other examples that are derived mostly from applied research have been offered by van Willigen (240).

Part of our pessimism in these matters seems to result not from a dearth of contributions to policy issues but from a failure to distinguish between policy science and the making of policy—the former being an area in which most anthropologists have, largely by choice, had little experience and impact. To become more involved in policy decision-making is not the same thing as becoming responsible policy scientists. It implies learning a good many other skills than those associated with scientific inquiry.

The profession has recently gone some distance to encourage anthropologists to adopt such skills—through the development of congressional fellowships and other opportunities for involvement in public policy formulation, the support of various styles of practice requiring skill in planning and management, and on occasion by lobbying the government on the behalf of issues of particular concern to anthropologists. The most successful efforts of the latter kind have been in archeology (134, 160) and in cultural conservation (49, 146). One problem particular to making social and cultural anthropology more responsive to public issues has been the diversity of our interests, and perhaps also a lack of consensus on many questions of public policy.

In government decision-making a distinction is made between “policy” and “program.” This distinction also exists tacitly in our conceptualization of the scope of applied anthropology. The large part of the work done by applied anthropologists over the past half century is best described as having to do with program assessment rather than with the making of policy or the building of an abstract science. The case study is the hallmark of these endeavors. As I mentioned earlier, a major limitation of the case-study approach in applied anthropology has been the tendency to pay little attention to the consequences of most cases, leaving unanswered the question of how anthropology actually contributed (or did not contribute) to change. Recent collections of case studies show increased sensitivity to this problem. Many of the cases in Eddy & Partridge (74), Stull & Schensul (225), and Wulff & Fiske (263) address the long-term consequences of the work of applied anthropologists.

One special focus that generally relies upon case study and merits discussion as an attempt to define a general direction for applied anthropology is advocacy and action, and most recently collaborative anthropology. These approaches share an explicit concern for the well-being of people who are experiencing change as a result of the intervention of others (or, in some
cases, because of the lack of effective intervention). The distinction between advocacy and action anthropology rests with a consideration of who has control over a piece of work. The parameters of advocacy work are generally determined by the anthropologist, while in action anthropology (in ideal terms) anthropologists make themselves available to appropriate clients who determine how anthropology might best contribute to their needs (118, 158, 228a). Both approaches are informed by the certainty that knowledge represents power and by the conviction that knowledge is best placed with those who are most likely to benefit or suffer from the initiatives of others. Action and collaborative anthropology recognize the close relationship between research and action. Collaborative research (196, 225) represents a refinement of the advocacy/action approach in several respects. The commitment to collaboration has been extended routinely to joint authorship on the part of representatives of the community and participating anthropologists, and there is in many cases a long-term commitment to a "client" group.

One danger of advocacy work is that it has the potential of favoring the interests of some clients and ignoring or slighting the interests of others. For example, recent support of efforts to set aside a substantial piece of Brazilian forest for the use of the Yanomani (7) responds to our profession's special interest in these peoples but may actually increase the risk to other Brazilian Indian groups and to landless peasant farmers (Andre-Marcel d'Ans, public lecture). Ideally, anthropologists might represent in their advocacy several sides of an issue, as they sometimes have in courtroom testimony (65) and when advising government agencies.

The possibility of conflict between the model of applied anthropology as a policy science and that of advocacy or collaborative anthropology is apparent in a recently published exchange between Cohen (51) and Collins (52). Our view of applied anthropology as a policy science is constrained by an inability to agree upon what a policy science might be or to appreciate the limits of all science. Our attempts to become involved in policy formulation are rudimentary in most cases, impressive in a few, and burdened by the diversity of our concerns. The bulk of the work in applied anthropology remains focused on trying to understand particular cases, and although there has been criticism of this tendency (248) we have seen considerable improvement in the writing of cases within the past decade.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

At the beginning of this review I offered a definition of applied anthropology that places emphasis on discovery in those circumstances that mediate the knowledge of anthropology and its uses. I have argued that this is the central problem of applied anthropology, at least for our time. Recent work in this
area suggests a third model for applied anthropology that holds forth the possibility of reconciling some of the differences between the models described above. While application may differ from the rest of the discipline in many respects—including its relationship to "clients," some of its research interests and strategies, and the variety of roles played by its adherents—the fundamental intellectual and theoretical problem that distinguishes the field is the need for critical knowledge that explores the spaces between what we know and what can be done with that knowledge. This unique interest does not draw applied anthropology away from the rest of the discipline; rather, it provides a special place for application that underscores its importance to us all.

In this approach, I take knowledge to be the experience of our discipline, informed both by inquiry and by presumptions of value. The uses of our knowledge are further informed by standards of inquiry and decision-making that may conflict with ours and by values that at times clearly differ from ours. Tendencies that continue to inhibit the potential of applied anthropology include:

1. The lack of a strong tradition for the critical evaluation of applied work and a reluctance on the part of applied anthropologists to attempt to generalize and draw conclusions on the basis of fieldwork that is not their own.

2. An implicit "positivism" that posits a direct relationship between knowledge and its uses—assuming, in other words, that "good" knowledge will find "good" use without much help on our part, or that if it does not the problem lies elsewhere in the ignorance and insidious politicizing of decision-makers.

3. A tendency to advocate uncritically one or another model of applied anthropology and to minimize the possibility of error and harm, coupled with a failure on the part of many anthropologists to distinguish between their standards of inquiry, which are at least unique in what they emphasize and in the ways they are combined, and their values, which are not unique but are a part of the general intellectual development of our times. This latter tendency leads at times to a claim for a special moral rectitude on the part of anthropologists that discounts the virtue of others and makes it difficult for us to appreciate the ethical and moral limits of our positions.

4. A Weberian tendency to avoid or deny the political and "nonscientific" implications of our work and a reluctance to admit nonresearch modes of practice into the profession, denying us the opportunity to prepare and recognize a cadre of individuals who are expert in mediating our knowledge and its uses and leaving us dependent upon others to decide the occasions and worth of our participation.

My point in summarizing these limits to effective application is to introduce some of the ways anthropologists have begun to address them and approach the kind of focus that is implied by the definition of the field I have offered.
One such example is provided in the reporting of long-term participation in specific applied problems. Sustained work devoted to problems of forced human resettlement (179, 205) has, for example, resulted in a better general understanding of the human costs of resettlement. This has in turn strengthened anthropologists' involvement in future policies designed to mitigate these costs (204, 230). Similarly, long-term collaborative work with a Hispanic community organization in Connecticut has resulted in a refinement of the assumptions and strategies of action anthropology (196, 200).

The most detailed example of this kind is found in commentary and evaluation related to the Vicos project, a major initiative begun in the 1950s by Alan Holmberg. This project attempted to provide a demonstration of the benefits of land reform in Latin America by actually acquiring a hacienda and eventually leading the villagers of Vicos to a position of independence. Thirty years of evaluation, both by participants in the effort and others (66, 68, 150, 153), coupled with an attempt to replicate aspects of the project elsewhere in Peru (174), have led to a number of interesting observations. Doughty (68) concludes that, while hopes of inspiring large-scale land reform in Latin America were not realized, the impact on the Vicos community was generally favorable. Babb (13) has, on the other hand, reported that the status of women in Vicos may have actually declined as a result of the interventions made by the project. In any case, the project offers the most comprehensive and thoroughly studied example we have of human intervention inspired directly by the actions of anthropologists.

A number of critiques have recently challenged our usual interpretations of the classics of applied anthropology. The Western Electric studies of the 1930s have long served as an example of the value of qualitative research in applied research. This work, which contributed to the development of a "human relations" model for business management, has since been criticized as having been conservative in its orientation to labor negotiations (138, 220), as having overemphasized improved human relations and discounted wages as a variable for improved employee satisfaction (250), and as being methodologically flawed (82, 83, 249). This latter criticism is of special interest because it points directly to the relationship between knowledge and its uses, suggesting that flawed data and analysis (and perhaps even ideologically suspect motives) might lead to beneficial change—in this case, when all is said and done, to a major impetus toward improved human relations in business and industry.

The involvement of anthropologists during World War II in advising the War Relocation Authority about the internment of Japanese Americans has recently been critiqued in two articles (220, 226) and reviewed with some candor by one of the participants involved in the project (215). This work has long served as an example of how anthropologists might become involved in a policy with which they disagree—in this case the decision to intern Japanese
Americans during the war—and still serve the best interests of humanity by encouraging cultural understanding and helping alleviate human suffering. The commentary cited above sharpens our awareness of the difficulties inherent in walking such a delicate course.

The folk principles of applied anthropology have often hinged on single, particularly persuasive cases such as these. Lauriston Sharp’s (208) observations on the human impacts of introducing steel axes to a village of Papuan New Guinea tribespeople has, for example, long served as an example of the dire unintended consequences that accompany seemingly beneficial technological changes and has reinforced a “nay-saying” tendency on the part of many applied anthropologists. Much less appreciated in our literature have been reports of similar interventions that did not result in widespread social upheaval.

The materials noted above represent a change in our habits of storytelling, produced in part by the opportunity to attend to the long-term consequences of our activities and inspired in part by the beginnings of serious critical attention to this work. There are additional contributions that have approached our knowledge and its uses in other ways. Most applied anthropology, for example, contains at least an implicit theory of knowledge use. Sol Tax (228a) introduced anthropology to a theory of knowledge use that called for building links between research and action. The idea of “feedback loops” between basic and applied research (241) also represents a theory of utilization. Applied anthropologists have become more explicit about the assumptions they make concerning knowledge and its uses, as is evidenced by a recent special journal issue devoted to exploring the theoretical bases of applied work (198). Related to these efforts are attempts to assess the work of applied anthropology in the terms of a growing literature concerned with knowledge utilization (38, 202).

Another approach to knowledge use is found in recent work offering critiques of the settings in which human intervention and change occur, harkening back to an earlier interest in theories of social and cultural change and innovation. Recent examples include Britan’s (26) study of bureaucratic change in a new government agency, Schwartzman’s (203) work on mental health organizations, and my attempt (39) to draw generalizations from recent ethnographic research devoted to the evaluation of experimental social programs. Also in this category are the long-term studies of “post impacts” discussed above (173, 235) and attempts to critique applied research methods on the basis of a systematic review of existing applied research reports (25, 116). Other approaches to a critical understanding of knowledge use include attempts to identify the implicit “theories” that underlie models for planned change and efforts to analyze the assumptions of applied research strategies. Schensul’s (199) suggestion that policies can be treated as theories is an
example of the former approach. Douglas & Wildavsky’s (69) cultural analysis of risk assessment strategies and Jorgensen’s (126) review of social impact assessment methods are examples of the latter. In these endeavors we might look to other fields—Miller (166) has, for example, written a persuasive account of the kinds of assumptions about change that inform different approaches to urban planning and community development.

In effect, applied anthropologists are today in a better position than ever to approach the problem of how their knowledge is mediated by considerations of utility. A continuation of these efforts is bound to result in a growing appreciation of both the theoretical and moral dimensions of applied work. That issues of theory and morality are inseparable seems to be one of the conclusions we can draw now. It is likely that we will in the near future see new attempts to describe both the potentials and limits of applied work in the terms of critical theory and interpretive science (2, 85, 181, 210). If we are wise, we may also begin to better understand the interdependence of seemingly conflicting theories of knowledge use. Lévi-Strauss (141) has pointed out that Marx’s early study of the human consequences of British industrialization relied heavily on the data collected by social scientists in the employ of the industrialists. We are not yet sure what to make of observations of this kind.

THE PRACTICE OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

One of the more significant recent changes in applied anthropology has been the emergence since the mid 1970s of serious attention to the idea of practice outside academic settings. This has included the exploration of opportunities in research as well as nonresearch careers in such areas as planning, human service delivery, administration, and management (107). Advocates of this tendency argue that anthropologists have made valuable contributions in a great variety of nontraditional roles. They also tend to argue that practice outside academia is encouraged if not necessitated by diminished employment opportunities within academic settings. Critics have argued that anthropologists are likely to become “mere technicians” when they seek careers outside universities (91, 163). None of these arguments address what I feel is the major justification for our interest in practice, which is that anthropology has a need for persons who are expert in translating and mediating the knowledge of our discipline. The lack of development of a practitioner arm in anthropology does not ensure the purity of the anthropological enterprise so much as it guarantees that the knowledge of anthropology will be little used and that, when it is used, it is likely to be misused.

Examples of practice outside academic settings are readily found in the publication Practicing Anthropology, in some recent edited volumes (74, 263), and in profiles published from time to time in the Anthropology
Newsletter. Although our profession has gone some distance in recognizing and encouraging practice, few clear models of practice have emerged. The definition of a practitioner ranges from (a) anyone with a degree in anthropology who is not employed in academia; through (b) an anthropologist who "practices" rather than does research; to (c) an anthropologist who has a primary concern with the mediation of anthropology and its uses, regardless of where she or he is employed.

Wulff & Fiske (263) describe the current state of practice in anthropology as a process in which anthropologists identify and move into problem areas staked out by other professions. Professional practice must, accordingly to Wulff & Fiske, await anthropologists’ ability to “define a problem realm,” define “a body of knowledge that is uniquely effective for diagnosing and solving their problem realm,” and find “clients who recognize the exclusivity of the professions’ problem domain and who are willing to pay for the practitioner’s uniquely effective knowledge.”

I think it is in the first criterion that practitioners of anthropology are most likely to fall short of the sort of profession Wulff & Fiske envision. Practice in anthropology seems most likely to be represented by its approach to a wide and diverse set of human problem areas, and it shows every sign of expanding rather than narrowing the diversity of the professional niches it enters. It seems most likely that, if it is to do so at all, practice will make its mark along the lines of the second criterion, by developing a coherent and demonstrably useful sense of cultural analysis that might be employed in many different settings.

The models of practice in anthropology currently available are built largely from the experience of individual practitioners. While, as devoted empiricists, we might hope that a direction for practice will develop solely from our observations of what practitioners do, it is worth keeping in mind that effective practice in other professions has generally relied upon establishing a connection between theory, practice, and training. For example, the profession of social work could not have been realized without widespread acceptance of a new “theory” of the causes of poverty and would not have been sustained without the development of training to prepare students for a specific kind of intervention.

APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN OTHER COUNTRIES

This review has concentrated on the recent development of applied anthropology in the United States. I do not have the competence to address the international scope of application. Such a view is inhibited by a lack of readily accessible material and, in my view, by the fact that any description of

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3This summary is taken from a prepublication copy of the volume edited by Wulff & Fiske.
applied anthropology is dependent upon an understanding of the national settings in which it occurs. Thus "development anthropology" is different in Great Britain because the national experience of involvement with less-developed countries is different from the experience of the United States. Similarly, the relationships between general anthropology and applied anthropology are different in some countries. Many Latin American countries, for example, have never experienced the same split between general anthropology and application as has been apparent in the United States. Some countries, such as Mexico, have a long tradition of anthropologists being involved in public affairs, reflecting in part different national attitudes toward the relationship between political and academic institutions. Some applied anthropologies have their roots in colonialism; others, as in India, have their start in the survival of colonialism or, as in the People's Republic of China, in revolution.

The generalists among us might look beyond such disparate influences for common characteristics. Others, myself included, find in these national differences further proof of the circumstantial and situational nature of applied work. Neither direction, unfortunately, has been pursued with much enthusiasm. Foster (78) offers sketches of applied work in several countries other than the United States. A couple of the volumes coming out of the 9th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (115, 185) include examples of development anthropology from different countries. Bastide (17) has addressed differences in development strategies in socialist and capitalist settings. One promising area for research would be to contrast the influence of national priorities on specific public policies. Engle (75) has conducted a study of this kind related to bilingual education.

I am aware of a number of reports on applied anthropology in other countries, such as Italy (183), France (53), Peru (174), Costa Rica (11), China (114, 161), and India (157). The literature most accessible to readers in the United States comes from Canada (19, 84, 149, 168, 177, 187, 188) and Great Britain (76, 97, 103, 151).

PROFESSIONAL ISSUES IN APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

It is likely that the increased attention paid to applied anthropology has contributed more to our current thinking about the profession (as opposed to discipline) of anthropology than has any other single event. The fields of application are now represented by a considerable variety of organizations, including several that focus on specific topical areas (38) and a number of others devoted to issues of practice (262). Institutes representing particular applied interests—such as the Institute for Development Anthropology in Syracuse and the Anthropology Resource Center in Cambridge—have de-
veloped impressive research and publication programs. This tendency toward institutionalization is also seen in the development of university-based programs designed for the training of applied anthropologists. The first published guide to such programs (241) listed 31 universities with some focus on application, ranging from “traditional” departments that offer opportunities for students to focus in some aspect of applied work (such as medical or development anthropology) to programs that are exclusively devoted to applied training (50, 71, 137, 196, 221, 259). Applied programs differ in degree emphasis, with a tendency to focus more on the Master’s degree than is apparent in general anthropology, and differ also in their adherence to liberal arts and professional school models of education and training.

Every endeavor in anthropology is a study in professional ethics. If we accept the idea that social science cannot be divorced from ideology, then every effort in anthropology is also a study in morality. Applied anthropology presents the profession with a number of dilemmas concerning the ethics of our work. Our greatest challenges are expressed in a couple of classic cases, the Camelot project (110, 247) and the Thailand controversy (58, 258). Applied anthropologists have been concerned, from different vantage points, with federal regulation of their research (34, 41). The major ethical issues that have a direct bearing on applied research have to do with client relationships and “secret” or proprietary research (40, 104). A number of anthropologists (10, 21, 59, 154) have recently addressed moral issues related to anthropology in general, making it clear that crises in the moral dimension of our profession are not limited to applied work. Though they seem far apart, applied anthropology and interpretive approaches to anthropology may have more in common than is obvious. Both are reaching for a better understanding of the relationships between theory and practice, and both show a readiness, however reluctantly, to tolerate uncertainty and a degree of moral ambiguity.

A CONCLUSION OF SORTS

I live near the nation’s capitol, and on occasion I visit the Vietnam War Memorial. It is partly the habit of a veteran and partly my memories as a college student that draw me there, because I had the opportunity to be both during the 1960s. But I am also attracted to the site because it is one of the best places I know to experience the emotional side of our recent intellectual history—a brief history of attitudes that continues to grip our imagination and to affect us in both our personal and professional lives. It is appropriate to think of ourselves as part of a “post-Vietnam era” and to recognize that as anthropologists we have responded to the emotional and intellectual temperament of our times. We are a profession of many claimed virtues—the good aims of science, the purity of our ideology, and the righteousness of our
intentions—but we no longer (if we ever did) share those virtues in the same ways. Still, whatever their convictions, few anthropologists claim that our inquiries should be without prejudice on the side of some sense of good will and reform. Even the most "value free" stance finds its appeal ultimately in a belief that it is better for our world to have the knowledge of anthropology than not, and even the most empirically minded among us generally imply that a world enlightened by anthropology will somehow be a better world. This is not necessarily true; it is at least possible to imagine that it is not at all true. But our assumptions of value are necessary. Without them, we cannot sustain a discipline acceptable to us.

The literature of anthropology lags far behind its realization. This is especially apparent in applied anthropology because some of the best applied work is done long before it finds a place on the record, and some of it is never written but only experienced in desires to know, expressions of charity, and little vanities of wanting to make big differences in the world. Just as our literature lags behind our actions, so do we experience delay in our emotional responses to our work, and to the endeavors of our colleagues. This review is intentionally one of anticipation and irony. I will end with a nod to both.

To my mind, the greatest present irony of applied anthropology is found in the contrast between a profession, which looks outward for survival and is careful of its image, and a discipline, which must contemplate itself with keen skepticism. The more I read on the present state of applied anthropology, the more apparent this seems. We are engaged in a struggle to demonstrate our worth in a world that seems disinterested if not hostile, and we are at the same time obligated to chip away at every foundation of our enterprise. Having begun to convince others that there is a valuable certainty in our work, we are ourselves less sure of where that certainty lies. This, I suggest, is a good course to be on, even if it is discomforting. It is the stirring of our critical sense.

Then we have our anticipation. I have become impatient with the notion that we may at some future date have a viable applied anthropology. We do have a healthy and vital applied anthropology. Its vitality occurs on many fronts, and sometimes in conflicting ways. My greatest anticipation of applied anthropology has much to do with the jumble of feelings I have when I visit the Vietnam War Memorial. The strange and haunting beauty of that memorial is in its polished black granite facade—a surface that, however we approach it, reflects our image and mirrors our contemplation. In the United States, anthropology has just begun to realize the depth of a moral crisis that is no longer outside itself—something to which it might rally and react—but that is finally recognizable as a creature of our own manufacture, fully invested in our participation in the world (154). In acknowledging both the intellectual and moral dimensions of this crisis I think applied anthropology has much to
contribute to our discipline. It may well be that the ironies and conflicts inherent in anthropology’s sense of purpose had to wait for the emergence (and threat) of a strong and critical sense of application. I have stood at that memorial many times and wondered what it means. Its meaning, I must conclude, is in the making.

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